SSRN Author: Michael Emmett BradyMichael Emmett Brady SSRN Content
https://privwww.ssrn.com/author=1033456
https://privwww.ssrn.com/rss/en-usWed, 24 Mar 2021 01:18:13 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Wed, 24 Mar 2021 01:18:13 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0New: Why Did F. P. Ramsey Never Repeat the Claims He Had Made on the First Page of His Jan., 1922 Cambridge Magazine Three Page Note Concerning Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability?: It Is Easy for a Reader To See That Ramsey’s Review Is Dead Wrong if That Reader Has Actually Read the 'A Treatise on Probability'The first page of the 18 year old, F. P. Ramsey’s very short three page review, in the Cambridge Magazine issue of Jan., 1922, of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability is comprised of claims about Keynes’s logical theory of probability that, to use L. J. Savage’s characterization of academics who tried to apply his Subjective Expected Utility model to Large Worlds (macro, intertemporal, long run decision making), as opposed to Small Worlds (micro ,short run decision making), was “utterly preposterous” and complete ”nonsense”.<br><br>Ramsey’s very small review was obviously never refereed J. M. Keynes and/or Bertrand Russell could have made short work of the 18 year old Ramsey’s note in a few minutes, thereby permanently ending his academic career at Cambridge before it ever had a chance to get started. However, they decided not to do so, as they recognized that Ramsey had special intellectual gifts, although they were clearly undeveloped at the time. Keynes decided to take Ramsey under ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3785695
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2006225.htmlTue, 23 Mar 2021 13:34:19 GMTNew: What Was E. Borel Referring to in His 1939 Book when He Describes '…the Beautiful Work of Mr. J.m. Keynes…' in the A Treatise on Probability? The Answer Is the Belated Recognition on Borel’s Part of the Extremely Important Part Ii of the A Treatise on Probability on Imprecision and Inexact MeasurementE. Borel, in his 1924 review of the A Treatise on Probability, did not read Part II. He skipped Part II, although he did apologize to Keynes and Russell for doing so in his review, acknowledging that this was the most important part of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability .Borel was certainly correct .He does not use the word “beautiful” to describe Keynes’s work at any place in his 1924 review. Now Parts I, III, IV, and V of the A Treatise on Probability are well done and make some breakthroughs, as acknowledged by Edgeworth in 1922 in his two reviews. <br><br>However, statistics is not the type of mathematics where one mathematician would use the highest form of compliment possible among mathematicians, ”beautiful”, to describe the work of another mathematician. Borel recognized that Keynes was certainly a mathematician.<br><br>By a process of elimination a la Sherlock Holmes, Borel can only be talking about Part II of the A Treatise on Probability. Part II is the part that Borel ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3785436
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2006123.htmlTue, 23 Mar 2021 11:51:14 GMTNew: Using Keynes’s Conventional Coefficient of Weight and Risk, C, From Chapter 26 of His a Treatise on Probability, to Help Explain Keynes’s Three Equations in Chapter 17 of the General Theory That Integrate (A) Expectations (Probability, Linear Risk), (B) Liquidity (Uncertainty, Weight of the Evidence, W) And (C) The Risk of Appreciation/DepreciationThe mathematical equations Keynes wrote out in chapter 17, in explaining his generalization of his theory of liquidity preference, are simplifications of his conventional coefficient of weight and risk, c ,that were used by Keynes to integrate non additivity(V(a/h)=w)and non linearity{[1/(1+q)]} into a more advanced formula that generalized the linear and additive mathematical expectation, pA, which only used probability(risk),to incorporate both liquidity preference(w) ,l, and the risk of appreciation/depreciation, a(1/1+q),as cA, where c=(p)(2w/[1+w]) {1/(1+q)}(A).<br><br>Sraffa and all economists following his extremely misleading scribbled margin notes in his copy of the General Theory in chapter 17 are basically using pA. Liquidity preference has absolutely NOTHING to do with probability.<br><br>The result has been that chapter 17 of the General Theory, which is quite obvious in its presentation to a reader of chapters 6 and 26 of the A Treatise on Probability, has been made ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3781224
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2004575.htmlFri, 19 Mar 2021 12:23:56 GMTNew: On the Need for All Academics, Especially Philosophers and Economists, to Bypass Pp.112-118 and Pp.264-273 of C. Misak’s 2020 Biography of Ramsey Dealing with J M Keynes, Due to the Presence of Far, Far Too Many Errors of Omission and Commission: The Keynes-Townshend Correspondence of 1937-38 Shows that Ramsey’s 1922 Critique of Keynes Had No InfluC. Misak’s 2020 biography of Ramsey has major errors in it, as regards the influence of Ramsey on Keynes with respect to the issue of probability, as well as her completely unsubstantiated retelling of the R B Braithwaite myth that an 18 year old Frank Ramsey showed up at Cambridge University and published a small, three page, unrefereed critical note in the January, 1922 issue of the Cambridge Magazine that supposedly demolished and destroyed Keynes’s logical theory of probability.<br><br>Ramsey had no idea about what Keynes’s logical theory of probability was. For instance, Ramsey had no idea that Keynes’s logical, objective probability relations are practically identical to logical, objective similarity relations. Ramsey also had no idea that Keynes’s "mysterious non numerical probabilities", that did not obey the rules of additivity, complementarity, and linearity of the precise mathematical calculus of probability were, in fact, interval valued probabilities that Ramsey did not ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3780538
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2004513.htmlFri, 19 Mar 2021 10:58:13 GMTNew: Sraffa’s Conceptualization of Own Rates Is Based only on Probabilistic Price Expectations because Sraffa Accepted Ramsey’s Definition that Confidence Is Measured by Subjective Probability Alone: Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Function in the General Theory Has Nothing to Do with Probability, but Is An Inverse Function of the Evidential Weight of theSraffa made a number of margin notes in chapter 17 in his copy of the General Theory .Contrary to Joan Robinson’s 1978 claim ,that Sraffa had uncovered logical and mathematical errors in Keynes’s liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest when he generalized his theory in chapter 17,the margin notes made by Sraffa are all erroneous .<br><br>Sraffa’s margin notes hold only in the very special case where the evidential weight of the evidence,V(a/h) =w ,0≤w≤1,equals 1,so that the evidential weight of the evidence is complete. Sraffa accepted F P Ramsey’s subjectivist theory of probability where Ramsey conflates degree of belief with degree of confidence, since for Ramsey the subjective probability estimate is the degree of confidence. There is no uncertainty in Ramsey’s theory because all probability estimates are additive and linear.This means that there is no vagueness or ambiguity ,so that there is no need for a second decision variable called the evidential weight ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3778428
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2004051.htmlThu, 18 Mar 2021 14:21:23 GMTNew: All Academics, Especially Philosophers and Economists, Need to Stop Citing Ramsey’s January, 1922 Paper in the Cambridge Magazine: Ramsey’s ‘My Carpet Is Blue’ and ‘Napoleon Was a Great General’ Example Is Simply NonsensePage 1 of Ramsey’s 1922 very brief note(see also Mellor’s republication in the Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 40 (1989), 219-222) attempted to review Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability in the January 1922 issue of Cambridge Magazine on pp.3-5, contains a silly, stupid, and foolish example of what Ramsey claims is an application that follows from Keynes’s logical theory of probability as contained in the A Treatise on Probability. In fact, Ramsey’s example has absolutely nothing to do with anything written by Keynes on probability or in the A Treatise on Probability in his lifetime. <br><br>The Ramsey example consists of two propositions. My carpet is blue and Napoleon was a great general. Neither proposition contains any relevant evidence,h, that could be used to support a conclusion,a, with regard to the other. Ramsey presents an analysis that “…, for example between 'My carpet is blue' and 'Napoleon was a great general'…”(Ramsey,1922,p.3;1989, pp. 219-220) makes no sense and is certainly not ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3770961
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2003589.htmlWed, 17 Mar 2021 12:08:39 GMTNew: Teaching only about Keynes’s Contributions in Chapter 1 (Plus Possibly Chapters 2, 3, 6 and 26, if Time Permits) of the A Treatise on Probability Falls Far ,far Short of Providing Students with An Informed Foundation about Keynes’s Analysis of Decisionmaking,rationality and expectationsTeaching students about Keynes’s views on decision making ,expectations and rationality requires that the students have had a general introduction and overview of Parts II(interval valued probability), III(finite probabilities)and V(statistics, inexact measurement,and approximation, as discussed by Keynes in Chapter Four of the General Theory on pp.39-40 and 43-44) of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability (1921) and a detailed coverage of chapters 15 and 17 of his Part II of the A Treatise on Probability on the importance of interval valued probability .<br><br>Keynes argued in Chapter 15 that decision makers in the real world mainly rely on and use interval valued probability in a heuristic manner. They are not relying on the use of ordinal probability which is simply far, far too weak to provide a foundation for rationality.<br><br>Meeks’ coverage of chapters 1-4 of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability plus her possible excursion into chapters 6 and 26 would fail to provide the basic ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3774957
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2003193.htmlTue, 16 Mar 2021 17:42:09 GMTNew: F P Ramsey’s 1922 (January) Cambridge Magazine, Three Page Comment on Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Is the Foolish Ruminations of an Ignorant 18 Year Old Teenager: It Is Not “brilliant” (G. Wheeler, 2012) It Is Not “Astute and Meticulous” (Methven, 2015) and It Should Never Have Been Republished in 1989 in the British Journal for the PhilosophRamsey’s attempted three page “review “ of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability ,published in January ,1922 in the Cambridge Magazine, contains many false representations of Keynes’s logical theory of probability. This “review” is the foundation for Braithwaite’s 9 page editorial foreword placed at the front of Volume 8 of the 1973 Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes edition of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>I was required to refute this editorial foreword by Braithwaite in late 1980 in order to be allowed to begin my June ,1983 Dissertation on Keynes. It only took me three quarters of one hour to convince one of the three supervisors on my committee to agree with me that I had made a very good case to him that Ramsey had no idea about what he was talking about since the core of the A Treatise on Probability ,Part II,is a theory of non additive, inexact, imprecise probability using approximate measures that has nothing to do with Ramsey’s ruminations on ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3772884
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2002421.htmlMon, 15 Mar 2021 11:45:36 GMTNew: Using P. Samuelson’s 1952 Assessment of the Role of Mathematics in Economics To Evaluate Keynes’s Is-Lm Model in Part IV on Pp. 298–299 in Chapter 21 of the General TheoryP. Samuelson showed clearly in 1952 that a mathematical economics analysis using abstract symbols can be written out in clear English(or any other language) as well.<br><br>Samuelson’s assessment of the interchangeability of a correctly translated mathematical analysis into English was clearly accomplished by Keynes in the presentation of his IS-LM model in Part IV on pp.298-299 in Chapter 21 of the General Theory.<br><br>The only two possible conclusions that explain the total failure of macroeconomists since 1936, excluding D. Champernowne, Keynes’s best student, to understand Keynes’s IS-LM model as presented in Part IV on pp.298-299 in Chapter 21 of the General Theory is (a) that they are either very poor applied mathematicians or (b) they have been misled by the Pseudo Keynesians, identified by Terrence Hutchison as consisting of Joan Robinson, Austin Robinson, Richard Kahn, and Roy Harrod in a 1977 Hobart study.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3767703
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2000797.htmlWed, 10 Mar 2021 13:17:39 GMTREVISION: It Is Impossible to Understand Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability without An Understanding of Part II of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability: The McCann-Bateman Exchanges Over Ramsey’s Critique of Keynes of 1992The crucial differences between Keynes’s and Ramsey’s theories of logical and subjective probability are insurmountable Keynes’s theory is based on propositions, imprecise, Inexact, interval valued probability (or decision weights that are non-additive), and deals with degrees of rational belief while Ramsey’s theory is based on actual events or outcomes, is precise and exact, additive, and deals with degrees of belief. The only overlap between the two theories occurs if, and only if, Keynes’s w, 0≤w≤1, which measures the completeness of the evidential weight of the Argument, V(a/h), equals 1 and probability preferences are linear.<br><br>L J Savage’s important restriction, ignored by most all economists ,that his subjective theory of probability can only be applied to Small worlds (micro and short run) and never to Large worlds (macro and long run), would be a compromise that Keynes would most likely have accepted, since the question of Keynesian weight measured by w, usually does ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3765888
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2000536.htmlWed, 10 Mar 2021 10:00:52 GMTREVISION: It Is Impossible to Understand Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability without An Understanding of Part Ii of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability: The Mccann-Bateman Exchanges Over Ramsey’s Critique of Keynes of 1992The crucial differences between Keynes’s and Ramsey’s theories of logical and subjective probability are insurmountable Keynes’s theory is based on propositions, imprecise, Inexact, interval valued probability (or decision weights that are non-additive), and deals with degrees of rational belief while Ramsey’s theory is based on actual events or outcomes, is precise and exact, additive, and deals with degrees of belief. The only overlap between the two theories occurs if, and only if, Keynes’s w, 0≤w≤1, which measures the completeness of the evidential weight of the Argument, V(a/h), equals 1 and probability preferences are linear.<br><br>L J Savage’s important restriction, ignored by most all economists ,that his subjective theory of probability can only be applied to Small worlds (micro and short run) and never to Large worlds (macro and long run), would be a compromise that Keynes would most likely have accepted, since the question of Keynesian weight measured by w, usually does ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3765888
https://privwww.ssrn.com/2000171.htmlTue, 09 Mar 2021 16:44:11 GMTNew: Keynes’s Concept of Uncertainty Has Absolutely Nothing to Do with the Post Keynesian or Heterodox (J. Robinson, G. L. S. Shackle, P. Davidson, R. Skidelsky, R. O’Donnell) Concept of Fundamental, Radical, or Irreducible Uncertainty: Uncertainty Was Always Defined as a Range by Keynes so that It Always Came in DegreesKeynes’s concept of uncertainty from his 1908 Cambridge Fellowship dissertation to his death in 1946 was a range concept like probability-it could be measured on the unit interval between 0 and 1[0,1]. Uncertainty was an inverse function of what Keynes defined to be the evidential weight of the argument, which was specified formally by Keynes over two chapters of his A Treatise on Probability, chapters 6 and 26 as V=V(a/h) =V(a/h1, h2, h3, h4……hn, hn+1….) =w, 0≤w≤1, where w=K/[K+I] and 1-w=I/[K+I] when K=knowledge and I =Ignorance. The erroneous Heterodox, Post Keynesian version is V(a/h)=V = K/(K+I),0≤V≤1.<br><br>All Post Keynesian and heterodox economists reject Keynes’s formulation, which requires mathematical modeling that is non linear and non additive. Post Keynesian and Heterodox economists(PKHE) accept, instead, a definition of radical, fundamental or irreducible uncertainty that is equivalent to Keynes’s definition of ignorance, where w=0, which is an extreme outlier for ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3762865
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1999554.htmlMon, 08 Mar 2021 16:20:08 GMTNew: J M Keynes Was Never Concerned About Ramsey’s ‘Critique’ of His Logical Theory of Probability Because He Realized That Ramsey Had No Idea About What His Theory of Imprecise Probability Entailed: Ramsey Was an Advocate of Precise ProbabilityKeynes had successfully applied his theory of logical, imprecise probability in his Indian Currency and Finance(1913), during his time in the British Treasury from 1914 till 1919, and in his The Economic Consequences of the Peace(1919). What Keynes applied was the concept of inexact measurement and approximation, which in Part II of the A Treatise on Probability is clearly shown by Keynes to be an interval valued theory of probability of upper and lower bounds. <br><br>In January, 1922,an 18 year old Frank Ramey published an extremely poor review of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability in the Cambridge Magazine. Keynes realized immediately that Ramsey’s conceptualization of probability was an exact and precise version of additive mathematical probability with better epistemological foundations, while his theory was about inexact, imprecise, non additive interval valued probability. Keynes also realized that Ramsey’s theory always assumed that w, the evidential weight of the evidence, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3756573
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1997572.htmlWed, 03 Mar 2021 10:37:41 GMTREVISION: J M Keynes’s Mathematical Style: Very Concise, Precise , and ExactKeynes’s mathematical style, starting with his First Fellowship Dissertation in 1907 for Cambridge University, England, through his formulation of a linear, first order difference equation that incorporated the interaction of the Multiplier and Accelerator( called the Relation) for Harrod’s use in his August,1938 correspondence with Harrod, and ending with his exchanges over probability and statistics with J. Tinbergen, an advocate of the Limiting Frequency Interpretation of Probability in 1939-40,was always very concise, precise and exact.<br><br>Specifically, Keynes always provided the first steps in a mathematical analysis and the last step. However, he would rarely put in the intermediate steps. Keynes’s view was that he always provided a clear, literary, prose explanation of his analysis that would allow any reader of his work to grasp the same basic,fundamental points that were being made in the mathematical analysis. A reader concentrating on Keynes’s supplementary ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3304407
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1996984.htmlTue, 02 Mar 2021 09:54:57 GMTUpdate: J M Keynes’s Mathematical Style: Very Concise, Precise , and ExactKeynes’s mathematical style, starting with his First Fellowship Dissertation in 1907 for Cambridge University, England, through his formulation of a linear, first order difference equation that incorporated the interaction of the Multiplier and Accelerator( called the Relation) for Harrod’s use in his August,1938 correspondence with Harrod, and ending with his exchanges over probability and statistics with J. Tinbergen, an advocate of the Limiting Frequency Interpretation of Probability in 1939-40,was always very concise, precise and exact.<br><br>Specifically, Keynes always provided the first steps in a mathematical analysis and the last step. However, he would rarely put in the intermediate steps. Keynes’s view was that he always provided a clear, literary, prose explanation of his analysis that would allow any reader of his work to grasp the same basic,fundamental points that were being made in the mathematical analysis. A reader concentrating on Keynes’s supplementary ...<br/><i>The Paper was removed</i>
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3304407
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1996754.htmlMon, 01 Mar 2021 19:19:45 GMTNew: J M Keynes’s Theory of Evidential weight can only be expressed in a formal manner as V=V(a/h) =V(a/h1, h2, h3, h4……hn, hn+1….) =w, 0≤w≤1, where w=K/[K+I] and 1-w=I/[K+I] when K=knowledge and I =Ignorance.The erroneous Heterodox , Post Keynesian version is V(a/h)=V = K/(K+I),0≤V≤1.In 1990,J. Runde presented a formal, mathematical representation of Keynes’s theory of evidential weight, as presented in chapters 6 and 26 of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability ,as V(a/h)=V = K/(K+I).In 1999,A. Vercelli revised this to read as V =V(a/h) = K/(K+I), 0≤V≤1.We can identify this as the Post Keynesian – Heterodox formulation of what they thought Keynes was supposed to have meant .We will abbreviate this as PK-H.<br><br>The problem with the PK-H formulation is that it does not make any sense .It involves a basic ,fundamental error in conflating and confusing two separate fields, logic and mathematics,as Keynes’s V is a logical relation and not a mathematical variable.<br><br>Keynes correctly transforms his logical relation ,V,into a mathematical variable ,on p.315 of the A Treatise on Probability in the following manner :<br>“….where w measures the ‘weight,’(sic)…”(Keynes,1921,p.315).<br>Now Keynes had already properly discussed w as being “….the degree of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3755225
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1996532.htmlMon, 01 Mar 2021 12:26:07 GMTNew: On J Nevile’s (2000) , 'What Keynes Would Have Thought of the Development of IS LM'. It Is An Oxymoron, Given that J M Keynes Himself, and only Keynes, Originally Developed the IS-LM Model between December, 1933 and February ,1936, when It Was Published in the General Theory in Chapter 21 in Part IV on pp. 298-299Nevile writes that : “Thus, it is of considerable interest to speculate on what Keynes would have thought about the way ISLM became identified as "Keynesian" economics for most of the economics profession. We know, of course, what his first reaction to ISLM was in 1937.”(Nevile,2000,p.133).<br><br>Nevile is simply ignorant of the fact that Keynes spent pp.298-303 of Chapter 21 of the General Theory in 1936 first presenting the model on pp.298-299 and then discussing his IS-LM model’s strengths and weaknesses on pp.300-303.There is thus no need whatsoever to engage in any speculation about some supposed reactions on Keynes’s part in 1937 since Keynes’s “reactions” are all laid out explicitly in 1936 on pp.298-303.<br><br>Nevile’s 2000 view is simply repeated in 2016(2002) in Kriesler and Nevile: “In Section 2 we attempt to identify the ‘essence’ of Keynes’s central message and in Section 3 examine Keynes’s reaction to various formulations of the IS-LM to see what he thought important ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3745361
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1992723.htmlThu, 18 Feb 2021 17:02:43 GMTNew: On the Impossibility of F P Ramsey (R B Braithwaite) Being Able To Have Covered Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability in Six Months (Brathwaite’s Claim Was That He Had Read It in Two Months), Given That Very Powerful Mathematicians, Like E Borel (1924), F Y Edgeworth (1922), and EB Wilson (1923), Admitted Publicly And Privately That It Was Not PossiblIn private correspondence in 1923-24, both Edgeworth and Wilson admitted to each other that it was impossible for them to follow Keynes’s presentation in Part II of the A Treatise on Probability (1921). In fact, Wilson stated that it was a mistake on his part to have even attempted a review of the A Treatise on Probability in 1923. Keynes’s book appeared in February 1921. Wilson’s understanding of Part II of the A Treatise on Probability was not demonstrated until the publication of his JASA article in September 1934.<br><br>Borel’s understanding was not demonstrated until a publication in 1939. Edgeworth died in 1926 and never published any paper dealing with Part II of the A Treatise on Probability. F P Ramsey’s first attempt to review the A Treatise on Probability was published in the January 1922 issue of Philosophical Magazine when he was still 18 years old. Let us assume that he obtained a copy of the A Treatise on Probability in March 1921 and submitted his paper for ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3744136
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1992384.htmlWed, 17 Feb 2021 16:11:09 GMTREVISION: The Demand and Supply for Money [M=L(r) ] is not the Demand and Supply for Liquidity[M=M1plus M2=L1(Y) plus L2(r) {=L}A major confusion among economists ,who have been writing on the General Theory since 1936,is to confuse the Demand and Supply for Money [M=L(r) ] with the Demand and Supply for Liquidity[M=M1plus M2=L1(Y) plus L2(r) {=L}.<br><br><br>Chapter 13 of the General Theory concentrates exclusively on the second of the two constituents which, together, determine the equilibrium rate of interest. The first constituent, the mec and investment multiplier, determines the IS equation(curve). Keynes dealt with this in chapters 8-12 of the General Theory. Keynes made it very clear that in chapter 13 he was going to deal exclusively with the second constituent, liquidity preference ,which had been ignored by classical economists. Chapter 15 puts both of the constituents together .In Chapter 14 of the General Theory , Keynes demonstrated on pp.179-182 that the neoclassical theory of the rate of interest generated a single downward sloping curve in (Y,r ) space.Neoclassical theory had NO Liquidity ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3294477
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1990434.htmlThu, 11 Feb 2021 09:12:25 GMTNew: On the Catastrophic Impact That the Many Myths Created by Joan Robinson Between 1936 and 1980 About J M Keynes and the
<i>General Theory</i> Have Had on Macroeconomic HistoryThe many, many myths created by Joan Robinson about J M Keynes and the General Theory, starting in the early 1930’s, have become embedded in the history of macroeconomics.<br><br>These myths, such as the claim that Joan Robinson worked closely with Keynes on the writing of the General Theory, that R. Kahn developed, explained and taught Keynes the theory of the multiplier, that there was no IS-LM model in the General Theory, that J. Hicks originated and developed the IS-LM model in the April,1937 issue of Econometrica, that fundamental uncertainty, as opposed to the uncertainty related to Keynes’ Evidential Weight of the Argument concept from his A Treatise on Probability (1921) ,was the central foundation of the General Theory, that Kalecki had written a version of Keynes’s General Theory in 1933-1935 in Polish that covered Keynes’s Theory of Effective Demand, that Keynes had not taken the 20 minutes necessary to learn the theory of value, that there was no formal, mathematical, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3739898
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1989729.htmlTue, 09 Feb 2021 13:03:46 GMTNew: On the Joan Robinson Myth about M. Kalecki Publishing a Version of the General Theory (1936) before Keynes in 1933-1935: Quite Impossible, Since Kalecki, a Frequentist, Never Wrote A Treatise on Probability(1921) and Had No Concept of the ‘Weight of the Argument’ That is the Foundation for Both Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of InJoan Robinson created a large number of myths in her lifetime aimed at attacking Keynes, such as the claim about R. Kahn inventing and teaching Keynes about the Multiplier, her claim that Keynes’s ‘instantaneous ‘ multiplier is highly suspect, her claim that Keynes had a purely monetary theory of the rate of interest, her claim that there is no IS-LM model in the General Theory, her claim that users of the IS-LM model that Keynes created are Bastard Keyesians, her claim that J. Hicks is the inventor of the IS-LM model, her claim that Keynes had never taken the twenty minutes necessary to learn the theory of value, her claim that Kahn was responsible for developing Keynes’s aggregate supply function in the General Theory, etc. <br><br>This paper deals with one of her many claims about M. Kalecki. It was her claim that Kalecki had published a version of the General Theory in Polish in articles in 1933-35 before Keynes published the General Theory in 1936.<br><br>Anyone who has read ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3735502
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1987645.htmlWed, 03 Feb 2021 16:28:24 GMTREVISION: Adam Smith’s Advocacy and Support for His Theory of Imprecise Probability Means That It Was Impossible for Him To Be a Utilitarian of Any Type, Benthamite or other: Any and All Types of Utilitarianism Necessarily Require Precise Probability As Advocated by Bentham in Chapter Four of His 1787 the Principles of Morals and LegislationAdam Smith demonstrated, repeatedly in his The Wealth of Nations in 1776 on, for example, pp.105-113,pp.227-244, pp.419-423,and p.714, his commitment and adherence to his theory of imprecise and inexact probability assessment that completely conflicted with Bentham’s exact, linear and additive approach based on precise probability. In chapter Four of his 1787 The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham lays out an explicit and detailed account of precise probability. Bentham explains clearly how his Max Utility approach is to be implemented. Bentham’s Max U approach requires, as a necessary condition, the use of precise probabilities (what he calls uncertainties) and precise numerical outcomes that are linear and additive so that aggregate “happiness” (material goods) can be maximized. Of course, this is precisely what Adam Smith rejected in his virtue ethics approach. <br><br>Smith’s integration of uncertainty into a decision making approach based on imprecise probability has ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3725964
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1985981.htmlFri, 29 Jan 2021 16:28:29 GMTNew: Keynes Rejected Kalecki’s Theory of Investment Because There Is No Major Difference Between Kalecki’s and Tinbergen’s Theories of Investment: Both Kalecki and Tinbergen Accepted Precise Theories of Probability Because They Were FrequentistsIt is quite impossible for Kalecki’s Theory of Effective Demand to have anything to do with Keynes’s Theory of Effective Demand because Kalecki, like Tinbergen, was a frequentist who accepted only precise, exact, additive numerical probability as the general case. For Keynes, probability was generally imprecise, inexact, non additive and non numerical (interval).<br><br>The belief that there is some kind of connection between Kalecki’s frequentist theory of investment and Keynes’s non frequentist theory is due to the false claims made by Joan Robinson, a mathematically and statistically illiterate economist, who did not realize that Kalecki’s theory of investment is in all major respects, just another version of Tinbergen’s theory based on frequentist, precise probability.<br><br>Lopez and Mott (1999) and Mott (2009) do not seem to have any knowledge of the fact that Kalecki’s theory of investment and Tinbergen’s theory of investment are, in all major respects, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3730811
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1984300.htmlTue, 26 Jan 2021 09:19:17 GMTREVISION: It Is Not Possible to Fix the Misleading Analysis Contained in the History of Economic Thought Website of the Hicks -Hansen Version of the IS-LM Model If One Is Seeking to Grasp Keynes’s Own, Actual IS-LM Model Presented in Chapter 21 in Part IV on pp.298-299 of the General Theory that uses M=L(r,Y),not M=L(r)Keynes’s IS-LM model in the General Theory, defined in (r,Y) space and contained in chapter 21 in Part IV on pp. 298-299 of the General Theory, was derived from the underlying D-Z model of Chapter 20 that incorporated expectations and uncertainty into the P(expected economic profits-Z) and p(expected economic prices-D)terms. Keynes explicitly derived Y from his Aggregate Supply Curve (ASC) analysis, which presented a locus of all possible expected D-Z intersections. The derivation of the ASC occurs two times in the General Theory. The first derivation is contained in ft. 2 of pp. 55-56 of the General Theory. The second derivation occurs in chapter 20 on p.283 in fts. 1 and 2 of the General Theory. Keynes then integrates the liquidity preference function formally into the D-Z model of chapter 20 on pp. 304-306 of chapter 21. Y is not derived from the IS curve a la Hicks, but from the D-Z model that incorporated long run concerns about future expected profits and the uncertainty of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3716259
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1981737.htmlMon, 18 Jan 2021 10:37:07 GMTNew: How J M Keynes Corrected the Only Major Error He Made in His General Theory in His Correspondence with J. Robinson between September and November, 1936: His Mention of Mrs. Joan Robinson in the Preface to the General TheoryJ M Keynes stated the following on p.xii of his General Theory on December 13,1935: “I have also had much help from Mrs. Joan Robinson….who have read the whole of the proof-sheets.” (Keynes,1936, p.xii).<br><br>In the course of an extensive correspondence with J. Robinson in the months of September, October, and November,1936, over one of her books that she had sent him for review and comment, Keynes discovered that Joan Robinson had (a) no knowledge of basic undergraduate, lower division level training in international trade and exchange rates between two countries and, much, much more seriously, (b) had a serious lack of knowledge about his Liquidity Preference theory of the rate of interest that occupied all or some of chapters 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21 of the General Theory.<br><br>It was now quite clear to Keynes that Joan Robinson had not understood what was in the final draft copy of the General Theory that he had given to her to read and comment on in June, 1935 and to ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3727672
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1981494.htmlSat, 16 Jan 2021 11:58:48 GMTNew: J M Keynes’s Very Severe criticism ( '…your argument…is most certainly nonsense.') of J. Robinson in Keynes’s Letter of November 9th,1936 was due to Robinson’s Use of the Incorrect M=L(r) Instead of the Correct M=L(Y,r)Keynes’s very negative reaction to J. Robinson’s misuse of Keynes’s initial, beginning, introductory, preliminary exposition of liquidity preference in chapter 13 of the General Theory is explained by the fact that J. Robinson was repeating the same identical error made by R. Hawtrey, D. Robertson, and H. Henderson, which was to simply ignore Keynes’s M=L(r,Y) analyzed by Keynes on p.199-209 of the General Theory and incorporated on page 298 as part of his formal IS-LM(LP) model presented on pp. 298-299 in chapter 21 in Part IV of the General Theory.<br><br>Instead, she used M=L( r) and/or M=L2(r). It is impossible to present an analysis of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference unless (Y,r) space is used.<br><br>Nowhere in Robinson’s 1935 comments on the final draft of the General Theory, sent to her by Keynes for review and comment, is there the slightest criticism/mention/discussion/query of a conflict between the two functions M=L( r ) and M=L( r,Y). Keynes had made it clear ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3726778
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1980690.htmlThu, 14 Jan 2021 11:06:24 GMTNew: An Analysis of Joan Robinson’s 1972 Article ‘What Has Become of the Keynesian Revolution?’ In Light of Keynes’s Assessment of Her Understanding of His Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest in His Letter of November 9th, 1936: ‘…For Your Argument… Is Most Certainly Nonsense.’Keynes ‘s first paragraph in his letter of the 9th of November, 1936, to Joan Robinson is the following two lines: “I beg you not to publish. For your argument as it stands is most certainly nonsense.”<br><br>Anyone who reads this correspondence will soon realize that it was simply impossible for Joan Robinson to have aided or contributed in any way to the development of the General Theory between 1930 and February, 1936, given the nature of these exchanges. Keynes is very specific as regards his Liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest: <br><br>“You do not seem to realize that if you are right the whole theory of liquidity preference has to be thrown overboard…Such a conclusion cannot be brought in as a tacit inference from an unargued obiter dictum.”<br><br>Given this clear and unambiguous statement by Keynes, how is it possible for joan Robinson to claim that she knows what Keynes was doing in the General Theory In 1936, in a reply to an article by H. Neisser, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3726312
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1980075.htmlTue, 12 Jan 2021 18:20:55 GMTREVISION: Adam Smith’s Advocacy and Support for His Theory of Imprecise Probability Means That It Was Impossible for Him To Be a Utilitarian of Any Type, Benthamite or other: Any and All Types of Utilitarianism Necessarily Require Precise Probability As Advocated by Bentham in Chapter Four of His 1787 the Principles of Morals and LegislationAdam Smith demonstrated, repeatedly in his The Wealth of Nations in 1776 on, for example, pp.105-113,pp.227-244, pp.419-423,and p.714, his commitment and adherence to his theory of imprecise and inexact probability assessment that completely conflicted with Bentham’s exact, linear and additive approach based on precise probability. In chapter Four of his 1787 The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham lays out an explicit and detailed account of precise probability. Bentham explains clearly how his Max Utility approach is to be implemented. Bentham’s Max U approach requires, as a necessary condition, the use of precise probabilities (what he calls uncertainties) and precise numerical outcomes that are linear and additive so that aggregate “happiness” (material goods) can be maximized. Of course, this is precisely what Adam Smith rejected in his virtue ethics approach. <br><br>Smith’s integration of uncertainty into a decision making approach based on imprecise probability has ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3725964
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1979963.htmlTue, 12 Jan 2021 15:19:32 GMTNew: Joan Robinson Never Understood Any Part of Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest in the General TheoryKeynes‘s first paragraph in his letter of the 9th of November,1936, is the following two lines: “I beg you not to publish. For your argument as it stands is most certainly nonsense.”<br><br>Anyone who reads this correspondence will soon realize that it was simply impossible for Joan Robinson to have aided or contributed in any way to the development of the General Theory between 1930 and February, 1936, given the nature of these exchanges.<br><br>Keynes is very specific as regards his Liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest:<br><br>“You do not seem to realize that if you are right the whole theory of liquidity preference has to be thrown overboard…Such a conclusion cannot be brought in as a tacit inference from an unargued obiter dictum,”(Keynes,1936,CWJMK,Vol.14, p.146).<br><br>Over the course of the two month correspondence from September 8th, 1936 till November 13th 1936, Keynes spent a great deal of time and effort trying to correct her many errors about his Liquidity ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3725978
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1979958.htmlTue, 12 Jan 2021 15:15:06 GMTNew: Adam Smith as an Example of Samuelson’s 1952 Point That Mathematics Can Be Written Out in the English Language: On Smith’s Anti-Utilitarianism Based on the Differences Between Precise and Imprecise Probability Presented in 1776 in the Wealth of NationsIn the Wealth of Nations in 1776, Smith gave two clearly worked out mathematical examples involving a comparison- contrast examining the concepts of precise probability (exact, definite, linear, numerical) and imprecise probability(inexact, indefinite, nonlinear, non numerical) that must incorporate uncertainty, which means there is missing or unavailable evidence that is not available to the decision maker at the time that he must make a choice between two or more different alternative options or alternatives. <br><br>Smith’s analysis is carefully presented on pp. 106-113 and pp. 419-423 of the Modern Library edition of the Wealth of Nations edited by Cannon with the foreword by Max Lerner. It is interesting that there has not been a single academic economist, philosopher, historian, sociologist, psychologist, political scientist, social scientist or decision theorist in the 244 years since Smith published the Wealth of Nations in 1776 to note this fact. <br><br>The fact that Smith ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3723176
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1977678.htmlWed, 06 Jan 2021 14:36:25 GMTNew: B. Hill’s ‘Confidence’ Approach to Decision Making Under Uncertainty Completely Overlooks the Contributions Made in J M Keynes’s Parts II -V of His a Treatise on Probability, 1921 and General Theory, 1936: Keynes’s Interval Valued Approach to Imprecise Probability and Decision Weight Approach Appeared Some 60–80 Years Before Hill Began His ResearchB. Hill’s work on the “Confidence approach “ to decision making under uncertainty is based on the use of interval valued probability that is categorized as being imprecise, in contrast to the standard Bayesian requirement that a probability assessment must be precise. This requirement is imposed by ignoring the issue of the relative strength or weakness of the supporting evidence upon which the assessment of different probabilities is being based ,or what Adam Smith referred to in 1776 in the Wealth of Nations as the differing quality of the supporting evidence.<br><br>Hill’s work overlooks the work done by J M Keynes in this area some 80 -100 years before his work appeared .The conclusion reached is that what Hill views as being a new, novel, original, creative, and innovative approach is, in fact, when compared to Keynes’s much earlier work, a marginal or incremental improvement only.<br><br>The problem is Hill’s reliance on the very poor work done on Keynes’s contributions by B. ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3720456
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1976670.htmlMon, 04 Jan 2021 10:26:54 GMTNew: The 1931 Kahn Multiplier Creation Myth: Its Incorporation in the 2019 Elgar Companion to John Maynard Keynes Demonstrates the Universal Belief of the Economics Profession in MythologyThe myth, that R. Kahn developed the mathematical and logical theory of the multiplier and then taught J M Keynes about the technical and mathematical properties of the multiplier concept is a myth deeply inbedded in the economics profession.<br><br>It then leads to another myth that without Kahn’s contribution, there would have been no possibility of Keynes having been able to write and publish the General Theory in February, 1936. This myth, like the myth that there is no IS-LM mathematical model in the General Theory, can be traced directly to deliberate canards originally made up by Joan Robinson repeatedly in her life time and also presented many times by G L S Shackle in his publications.<br><br>The historical facts are quite different from the concocted mythology. The technical and mathematical properties of the multiplier concept were first developed and applied by Keynes in 1921 in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability in section seven on page 315 in footnote 1. Kahn ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3691905
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1975629.htmlTue, 29 Dec 2020 17:25:44 GMTNew: J M Keynes’s 1931 Comment, “…I Yield to Ramsey, I Think He Is Right” Refers to Ramsey’s Work on Precise Probability and Degrees of Belief, Not to Imprecise Probability and Degrees of Rational Belief: 20th and 21st Century Philosophers and Economists Simply Are Ignorant About Keynes’s Imprecise Theory of Probability Contained in Part II of the A TreA major error ,committed by all philosophers and economists in the 20th and 21st century who have written on the 1931 comment of Keynes on Ramsey about “…I yield to Ramsey, I think he is right”, is their failure to recognize that Keynes’s logical theory of probability is an imprecise theory of non additive probability based on intervals and dealing with rational degrees of belief, whereas Ramsey’s theory is a precise theory of additive probability that deals with degrees of belief only. The two theories merge only in the every special case where Keynes’s weight of the argument, V(a/h) =w,0≤w≤1, has a value of w=1 and all probability preferences are linear.<br><br>Nowhere in any of Ramsey’s publications during his life is there ANY recognition on his part that the two theories are diametrically opposed except in the special case where w=1 and probability preferences are linear. It should have been obvious to Ramsey, if he had indeed read the book that he claimed he had read, that ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3719147
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1975454.htmlTue, 29 Dec 2020 12:16:40 GMTNew: Comparing Edgeworth’s and Ramsey’s Understanding of the Meaning of 'Logical, Objective, Probability Relations.' Ramsey’s View Is 'Utterly Preposterous' and 'Nonsense', Where We Have Borrowed Savage’s Verbal Condemnation of Economists Who Attempted to Apply the Subjective Theory of Probability Beyond Small Worlds (Short Run and Micro Applications onRamsey’s complete and total ignorance of Keynes’s definition of “objective, logical, probability relations”, contained on pages 35-36 of the A Treatise on Probability, which was explicitly referenced and discussed by Edgeworth in his two reviews, can only be explained by the conclusion that Ramsey never read more than a few pages of Part I of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability plus briefly looking at a maximum of an additional 2-3 pages from Parts II,III,and V.<br><br>The very idea that an 18 year old teenager could show up at Cambridge in 1921 and ,based on a small, 4 page, unrefereed note, that contains nothing correct in it about Keynes‘s A Treatise on Probability, allegedly convince J M Keynes that his logical theory of probability had to be abandoned, is ludicrous, silly, stupid, and foolish.<br><br>Ramsey’s crucial error was his failure to identify Keynes’s very clear definition of logical probability on pp.35-36,which was then developed in far, far, far greater detail in Part ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3707196
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1975240.htmlMon, 28 Dec 2020 16:50:25 GMTREVISION: It Is Not Possible to Fix the Misleading Analysis Contained in the History of Economic Thought Website of the Hicks -Hansen Version of the Is-Lm Model If One Is Seeking to Grasp Keynes’s Own, Actual Is-Lm Model Presented in Chapter 21 in Part IV on Part IV on pp.298-299 of the General Theory that uses M=L(r,Y),not M=L(r)Keynes’s IS-LM model in the General Theory, defined in (r,Y) space and contained in chapter 21 in Part IV on pp. 298-299 of the General Theory, was derived from the underlying D-Z model of Chapter 20 that incorporated expectations and uncertainty into the P(expected economic profits-Z) and p(expected economic prices-D)terms. Keynes explicitly derived Y from his Aggregate Supply Curve (ASC) analysis, which presented a locus of all possible expected D-Z intersections. The derivation of the ASC occurs two times in the General Theory. The first derivation is contained in ft. 2 of pp. 55-56 of the General Theory. The second derivation occurs in chapter 20 on p.283 in fts. 1 and 2 of the General Theory. Keynes then integrates the liquidity preference function formally into the D-Z model of chapter 20 on pp. 304-306 of chapter 21. Y is not derived from the IS curve a la Hicks, but from the D-Z model that incorporated long run concerns about future expected profits and the uncertainty of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3716259
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1974155.htmlTue, 22 Dec 2020 15:03:49 GMTNew: On the Strange Disappearance from the Keynes papers-King’s Archive, Cambridge, of Seven of Keynes’s Twelve letters to Joan Robinson between September 8th and November 9th,1936: Someone at Cambridge Did Not Want Future Academics Reading the Correspondence of That Two Month Period Between J M Keynes and J Robinson Because Anyone Reading These LettersIn a Table(Table 6.1-Keynes-J .Robinson correspondence ) contained at the back of a 2005 article by Marcuzzo and Sardoni,it is clear that someone had deliberately removed seven of the twelve letters of correspondence between J M Keynes(JMK) and Joan Violet Robinson(JVR) from September,8th through November 9th,1936 from this Cambridge archive. This is not mentioned by Marcuzzo and Sardoni anywhere in their article.<br><br>The correspondence between JMK and JVR began in April,1932 and ended in April, 1945.In that period of time ,a total of twelve of JMK letters to JVR disappeared from the archives. They were the letters of JMK to JVR on 10/16/1932, 5/8/1933, 4/17/1934,9/24/1941,3/24/1942, and seven of the Twelve letters from JMK to JVR in the two month span between between September and November,1936. <br><br>It is certainly plausible that letters can be misplaced or misfiled from an archive over long periods of time, such as the 13 years of letters between Keynes and Robinson from ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3713788
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1971570.htmlMon, 14 Dec 2020 12:26:17 GMTNew: On the Post Keynesian (J. Robinson, GLS Shackle, R. Skidelsky) Attempt to Substitute J M Keynes’s 1937 QJE article, The General Theory of Employment for J M Keynes’s 1936 General Theory: Their Attempt was completely Destroyed in the Keynes-Townshend Exchanges of 1937-38Joan Robinson, first with the aid of GLS Shackle, and then with the help of R. Skidelsky, attempted to convince academics, after Keynes had died in 1946, that Keynes had made major changes in his ideas on uncertainty and expectations in his 1937 QJE article that directly conflicted with what he had stated in the General Theory.<br><br>The major change that was claimed to have occurred was that Keynes had supposedly changed his definition of uncertainty from being a range of possible different degrees of uncertainty, between the extremes of Complete Knowledge and Complete Uncertainty, to becoming a situation of “fundamental uncertainty” (fundamental uncertainty is also called radical uncertainty, irreducible uncertainty, deep uncertainty, genuine uncertainty, and real uncertainty by heterodox economists), which Skidelsky defines as “When a person cannot …compare the probabilities of two arguments, he may, using a terminology drawn from recent discussion, be said to be in a state of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3712275
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1970480.htmlThu, 10 Dec 2020 11:59:01 GMTNew: On Joan Robinson’s Completely Successful Indoctrination of John Kenneth Galbraith: Turning a Potential Keynesian Into an Actual RobinsonianJoan Robinson took an anti scientific approach to methodology and philosophy of science. Her belief was that Keynes’s models (which she misrepresented as being R. Kahn’s models) were TRUE models while the Classical and Neoclassical models were FALSE models. This showed up again in the early 1950’s in the useless and sterile controversy about the neoclassical aggregate production function model. Joan Robinson believed that this was a FALSE model. Apparently ,her opponents believed it was a TRUE model. The only relevant question ,from a scientific point of view, is the question “Is this model useful or not in helping to explain the phenomenon under investigation? ”Asking this question would have put an end to this so called “debate” before it surfaced and ended up being published in economics journals.<br><br>Of course, Keynes NEVER believed that models are either true or false. Models are useful, but they are, at best, only approximations to reality. Therefore, a model can’t be true ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3707862
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1968143.htmlThu, 03 Dec 2020 11:32:35 GMTNew: One Hundred Years After Keynes Published His 'A Treatise on Probability' in 1921, Edgeworth’s Two Reviews Still Stand Out As Being Vastly Superior to the Assessments Made by Any Other Philosopher of the Logical Theory of ProbabilityF. Y. Edgeworth made the only correct assessment of Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability in his A Treatise on Probability among philosophers in the 100 years between 1921 and 2020. The reason is that he actually read the entire book, with the exception of Part II, which he was able to assess through his very careful reading of Part I.<br><br>The major problem confronting any philosopher, who wants to take into consideration the various different aspects of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, is the unfortunate fact that there is no philosopher,with the one exception of Edgeworth (Bertrand Russell did not read Part V), who has read beyond chapters 1-4 plus some parts of chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability. This assessment includes every philosopher associated with SIPTA, as well as B. Koopman, I. J. Good, T. L. Fine, P. Suppes, H.E. Kyburg, I.Levi, S. Zabell, as well as younger philosophers, such as B. Weatherson, D. Rowbottom, R.Bradley, S. Bradley, J. Williamson, T. ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3699834
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1966968.htmlTue, 01 Dec 2020 15:13:35 GMTNew: Joan Robinson Was the First Bastard Keynesian: There Is No ‘Perhaps’Joan Robinson was the first Bastard Keynesian. There is no “…perhaps…”(Aslanbeigui & Oakes, 2009, p.219) at all involved in that conclusion. The conflict between J M Keynes and J. Robinson was fundamental and basic. Keynes did not believe that his models and theories were true, since no theory or model can be true, given that models and theories are, at best, approximations of reality. Any scientist, either physical, life, behavioral or social, who believes that his theories and models are true, is a pseudo scientist at best and probably holds anti scientific views. This characterization is especially apropos when considering orthodox and heterodox economists, who believe that their models and theories are true.<br><br>Keynes believed that his models (multiplier, D-Z, IS-LM (LP), interval valued probability, inexact measurement, weight of the argument) were better, more reliable, more general and more useful than the Classical (excluding Adam Smith, who was never a classical ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3689765
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1965497.htmlWed, 25 Nov 2020 13:12:05 GMTNew: Jesus As a Philosopher: At the interface between Ethics, Economics, Politics, and Civics over 2000 years agoOver 2000 years ago, Jesus faced nearly the same kind of economic, institutional, political, and social problems that confronted Socrates over 400 years earlier in Athens, Greece. A certain segment of the upper income class in Jerusalem, called Sadducees, who were allied with Israel’s aristocrats, were engaging in practices that were damaging the economic and social health of Israel.<br><br>Jesus was a teacher of ethics and moral philosophy in Israel. Ethics dealt with the self (starting with those actions that provided security and safety through prudent behavior for the individual) while moral behavior concentrated on the interactions between one’s self and other selves (benevolence). Jesus’s main philosophical concern was teaching, applying, and living virtue ethics. Jesus’s main teaching tool was the parable, which was usually a short, fictitious story that made a clear cut ethical or moral point.<br><br>Jesus’s version of virtue ethics was very concise, brief, and to the point. ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3673759
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1965115.htmlTue, 24 Nov 2020 13:55:49 GMTNew: Wikipedia’s (Infogalactic) September, 2020 Discussion of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Doesn’t Make Any Sense One Hundred Years After the Book Was Published in February, 1921It has been one hundred years since Keynes published his A Treatise on Probability (Parts I-V). After 100 years, there are still no academic philosophers, psychologists, historians, economists, sociologists or political scientists who have any idea about the following topics covered by Keynes- <br><br>• Keynes’s clearly defined connection between his objective logical probability relations and objective logical similarity relations, which form the foundation for cognitive science and psychology, on pp.35-36 of Part I (chapter III) <br><br>• Keynes’s initial specification of the evidential weight of the argument in Part I (chapter 6) which Keynes finished in Part IV (chapter 26) <br><br>• Keynes’s interval valued and non additive approach to probability (Part II, chapters 10-17) based on Boole’s upper -lower probabilities approach specified in his The Laws of Thought (1954, pp. 265-269) <br><br>• Keynes’s finite probabilities of Part III using a modified version of Boole’s Problem X ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3704438
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1964279.htmlSat, 21 Nov 2020 15:15:35 GMTNew: F.Y.Edgeworth’s Two Reviews of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Easily Refutes G. Wheeler’s 2012 Claim About ‘…How Far Kyburg Went Beyond Keynes…’ (Wheeler, 2012, p.443):On the Need for Philosophers to Read Parts II, III, IV and V of the A Treatise on Probability or Edgeworth’s Two ReviewsH. E. Kyburg never read beyond chapter 6 of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability. From 1959 till his death in 2007, Kyburg continually based his assessment of Keynes’s accomplishments on pp. 30 and 34 of Chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability. Edgeworth’s careful and judicious reading of Keynes’s chapter III allowed him to conclude that Keynes’s theory was an interval valued theory of probability, as opposed to Kyburg’s claims that Keynes merely had made some comments that would lead one to conclude that Keynes had made some interesting “suggestions, hints, notions,i ntuitions, ideas,” that would lead to an interval valued theory of probability if they were developed mathematically and logically.<br><br>Wheeler ‘s evaluation of Keynes is simply a repetition of Kyburg’s nearly 50 years of evaluations ,which are vastly inferior to Edgeworth’s evaluation, which skipped Part II of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>A study of Part II of A Treatise on Probability reveals that ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3701603
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1962670.htmlTue, 17 Nov 2020 11:26:22 GMTNew: One Hundred Years After Keynes Published His a Treatise on Probability in 1921, Edgeworth’s Two Reviews Still Stand Out As Being Vastly Superior to the Assessments Made by Any Other Economist: All Heterodox Economists Reject the Unanimous Conclusion, Made by All Philosophers, That Keynes Hinted at or Suggested or Had a Notion About an Interval ValuF Y Edgeworth made the only correct assessment of Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability, as presented in his A Treatise on Probability, among economists in the 100 years between 1921 and 2020. The reason is that he actually read the entire book with the exception of Part II, which he was able to assess through his very careful reading of Part I.<br><br>The major problem confronting any economist, who wants to take into consideration the various different aspects of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability ,is the unfortunate fact that there is no economist, with the one exception of Edgeworth, who has read beyond chapters 1-4, plus some parts of chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability. This includes practically every heterodox economist who has written on Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, such as R. Skidelsky, D. Moggridge, R.O’Donnell, A. Carabelli , V. Chick, S.Dow, G.Meeks, J.B.Davis, A. Fitzgibbons, E.R Weintraub, J . Runde, T. Winslow, C. McCann, Jr., T .Lawson ,G. Fioretti, P. ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3700298
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1961820.htmlSat, 14 Nov 2020 14:51:17 GMTNew: Keynes Had Already Answered Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 Critiques Concerning Objective, Logical Probability Relations on Pages 35–36 of the A Treatise on ProbabilityRamsey’s 1922 and 1926 critiques about Keynes’s logical ,objective probability relations overlooked Keynes’s already specified response that Keynes had incorporated on pp. 35-36 of chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability FIVE YEARS before Ramsey made his critique .This fact calls into question (a) whether Ramsey ever actually read the book he claimed to be reviewing and (b) whether those adhering to Ramsey’s “critique “ ever read the A Treatise on Probability either. It is bizarre that these same unsupportable claims are being rehashed again in C. Misak’s autobiography on Ramsey in 2020.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3697924
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1961132.htmlThu, 12 Nov 2020 13:54:53 GMTNew: R. B Braithwaite’s Editorial Foreword to the 1973 Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Edition of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Is ‘…Very Puzzling, indeed.’ (Skidelsky, 1992, p.71)It is ‘…quite puzzling,indeed’(Skidelsky,1992p.71) how a paper as extremely poor and deficient as R. B. Braithwaite’s editorial foreword could have been selected to appear at the beginning of the 1973 Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Volume 8, version of the A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>Cheryl Misak presents the following testament from Braithwaite on page 114 of her 2020 biography of Ramsey concerning Keynes’s A treatise on Probability as “evidence” that Ramsey had demolished Keynes’s logical theory of probability,which is silly: <br><br>“Braithwaite’s reaction [author's note-Braithwaite's reaction to Ramsey's critique of Keynes] indicates how effective it was. He recalled that he read Keynes’s Treatise in the long vacation, immediately after it came out, and said that he swallowed it whole.”<br><br>It is simply impossible for anyone to have read Keynes’s book that quickly. The great French mathematician, Emile Borel, was very explicit about Part II of the A Treatise ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3676899
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1959034.htmlThu, 05 Nov 2020 19:59:26 GMTNew: Why Is Clive Bell, an Artist With No Training in Logic, Mathematics, Statistics or Probability, Being Cited as an Expert on J M Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability?Keynes had already answered Ramsey’s incoherent( bizarre?) criticism that “… the obvious one is that there really do not seem to be any such things as the probability relations he describes ..."on page 36 of the A Treatise on Probability BEFORE Ramsey ever made his criticism. Keynes pointed out that the “…analogy between orders of similarity and probability is so great that its apprehension will greatly assist that of the ideas I wish to convey.” Ramsey completely failed to grasp the analogy between similarity and probability before criticizing Keynes. No where does Ramsey show that he understands the analogy between probability and similarity that Keynes is using. Nor has any philosopher, economist, psychologist, sociologist, historian or decision theorist demonstrated any understanding of Keynes’s argument in the 20th or 21st century. Only in the writings of cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists is their evidence that Keynes’s position has been understood. I know of NO ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3693582
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1958879.htmlThu, 05 Nov 2020 14:51:50 GMTNew: On the Very Severe Contradictions, Inconsistencies, and Confusions in the Assessment of Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability in the A Treatise on Probability by Heterodox Economists: J.M. Keynes Showed That Incommensurability Is Dealt with by Interval Valued ProbabilityVery severe contradictions, inconsistencies, and confusions exist in the exchanges between two Heterodox economists, who are considered to be the top Heterodox experts on Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, logical theory of probability, and of the connections between the A Treatise on Probability and Keynes’s General Theory. <br><br> The exchanges between Sheila Dow and Anna Carabelli in 2015 show that they had no coherent understanding about the meaning of incommensurability (non comparability, nonmeasurability, incomparability) as was discussed by Keynes on pp. 30-34 of the A Treatise on Probability in 1921.<br><br>The standard assessment ,accepted by SIPTA and all philosophers who have written on Keynes’s contributions since 1921, with the exceptions of F Y Edgeworth, Bertrand Russell, and C D Broad, was made in 1999 by H E Kyburg in the initial SIPTA conference volume in 1999. He stressed that Keynes’s discussions imply a partial order, which means comparability based on ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3683053
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1958208.htmlTue, 03 Nov 2020 15:52:34 GMTNew: On Joan Robinson’s Role in Creating the Myth That R. Kahn Originated the Multiplier ConceptAn enduring myth accepted by all Orthodox and heterodox economists is that it was Richard Kahn who discovered and originated the concept of the multiplier. Kahn then supposedly showed Keynes how the multiplier concept could be specified mathematically so as to provide hard support for Keynes’s views in the late 1920’s about increased initial government spending on public infrastructure generating much larger increases in total spending than the original injection, leading to decreasing levels of unemployment. <br><br>There are three major problems with this story.<br><br>First, Kahn, himself, in a 1936 response to Hans Neisser in the Review of Economics and Statistics stated that most of his ideas about the multiplier concept came from Keynes. <br><br>Second,the mathematical and logical development of the multiplier concept had already been formalized and formulated precisely by Keynes in 1921 on p. 315 in footnote 1 of the A Treatise on Probability in section 8 of chapter 26. ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3690281
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1957833.htmlMon, 02 Nov 2020 16:13:04 GMTNew: ‘The Provocative Joan Robinson’ Was Completely Ignorant of Keynes ’S Chapter 21 Is-Lm Model on Pp. 298–299 of the General Theory Even Though She Supposedly Read the Final 1935 Draft of the General Theory: The Exchanges of September to November, 1936 Between Keynes and Robinson Show Her Complete IgnoranceOn pages 214-220 of their 2009 book, “The Provocative Joan Robinson: The Making of a Cambridge Economist”, Nahid Aslanbeigui and Guy Oakes, in a section titled”, Promoting The General Theory: Essays in the Theory of Employment”, attempt to cover up the nature of the exchanges between Keynes and Joan Robinson over Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory of the rate of interest in the time period between September and November,1936. <br><br> Keynes had demonstrated to Harrod on pp. 526-564 of Volume 14 of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, in the July – September ,1935 time period, that his liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest had to be analyzed in (Y,r) space using his IS equation and his LM equation on page 199 of chapter 15 of the General Theory.Harrod completely capitulated on this crucial point in his letter of August 30th,1935, admitting that Keynes has succeeded in making a "radical reconstruction” of the classical and neoclassical theories of the rate of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3687316
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1955246.htmlMon, 26 Oct 2020 11:45:47 GMTNew: How Sipta Overlooked Keynes’s Major Contributions to Imprecise Probability and Decision Making, 1999–2019The SIPTA(Society for Imprecise Probability ,Theory and Application) view of Keynes’s contributions to imprecise probability and application form a one-to-one, onto mapping from the claims of Henry E. Kyburg to what is accepted as being what Keynes’s contribution was. Thus, if one is familiar with Kyburg’s assessment of Keynes’s contributions, then one also knows what SIPTA’s views of Keynes’s contributions are.<br><br>There is an extremely severe problem here, however, because Kyburg never read beyond chapter 6 in Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability. Kyburg was, therefore, ignorant about the many technical and mathematical contributions made to the theory of imprecise probability by Keynes, such as upper and lower probabilities, non additive probabilities,sub additive probabilities, interval valued estimates, decision weights, etc, in Parts II, III, IV and V of the A Treatise on Probability. Non additive probability appears in Keynes’s applications of non additive probability in his ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3678032
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1952130.htmlFri, 16 Oct 2020 12:02:48 GMTNew: Assessments of J. M.Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability (1921), Made by All Academic Philosophers and Economists Since 1921, Rely on pp.30–34 of Chapter III, pp.71–78 of Chapter VI (Page 312 of Chapter XXVI) Plus Some Pages Taken From Chapter IV On the Principle of Indifference: No Current Academic Philosopher or Economist Has Any Specific UnderstanThe unanimous conclusion of philosophers and economists over the last 100 years is that Keynes‘s contribution to a theory of imprecise probability in his A Treatise on Probability was to provide some interesting notions, intuitions, ideas, suggestions, hints, or clues about imprecise probability, but that Keynes himself had never provided any worked out theory using mathematical and logical analysis. Henry E. Kyburg,Jr., over a period of 53 years from 1959 to 2011 (he died in 2007), argued that Keynes’s contribution came only from pp. 30-34 of chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability. This contribution was to suggest the idea of a partial order and the fact that not all probabilities were comparable, measurable or commensurable quantitatively. <br><br>Economists (for example ,D.Moggridge,R.Skidelsky, A.Carabelli,R.O’Donnell,J.Runde) concluded that Keynes had constructed an ordinal theory of comparative probability based on pp. 38-40 of chapter III of the A Treatise on ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3664480
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1951688.htmlThu, 15 Oct 2020 13:54:27 GMTNew: J. M. Keynes Made It Clear in His Correspondence to J. Robinson between September 8th to November 9th, 1936 that She Was Completely Ignorant of His Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest: It Is Simply Impossible that Joan Robinson Was “…One of J.m. Keynes’ Most Brilliant Students, Who Helped Him Draft the Original of His General TheoryThe myths concocted by Joan Robinson from the late 1940’s to the early 1980’s about J M Keynes live on today in the work of Post Keynesian, Institutionalist, and Heterodox economists. The most damaging of these myths is the one that claims that she worked closely with Keynes when he was writing the General Theory. Thus, according to Gram and Walsh, she was in a position to know exactly what he meant.<br><br>This myth was presented in a 1983 Journal of Economic Literature paper by H. Gram and V.Walsh. Of course, Gram and Walsh never mention pp.134-148 of the CWJMK in Volume 14 because it completely destroys the foundation for the claim that she worked closely with Keynes when he was writing the General Theory. Keynes‘s final message of November 9th,1936 is that Joan Robinson did not know what she was talking about. Keynes’s two months of exchanges with Robinson, between September 8th and November 9th,1936, show an exasperated Keynes presenting an intellectually devastating and ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3670729
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1950690.htmlTue, 13 Oct 2020 13:27:51 GMTNew: On the Need for a Major Revision of Investopedia’s Article on Adam SmithThere is no Theory of the “Invisible Hand of the Market” in either of Adam Smith’s two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) or The Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith uses the terms on one page each of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations as a literary devise only, as pointed out repeatedly by Gavin Kennedy over a twenty year period. None of the two references refers to market prices and wages moving up and down to clear markets.<br><br>The Invisible Hand appears one time in The Theory of Moral Sentiments as a metaphorical device used to explain why the rich nobles must supply their mass of servants with the necessities of life because, if they did not do so, then they would not have any servants to serve them on a daily basis in a wide variety of tasks. This has been pointed out numerous times by Gavin Kennedy. The Invisible Hand appears one time in The Wealth of Nations, again as a purely metaphorical devise to explain why merchants choose the domestic ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3668794
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1950688.htmlTue, 13 Oct 2020 13:18:15 GMTNew: One Hundred Years After Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Appeared, There Is Still Pervasive Confusion Among Academics About the Logical Theory of Probability: Keynes’s Theory of Logical Probability Is an Interval Valued Theory of Probability Based On Boole That the 18 Year Old Ramsey Never Understood in His LifeThe very recent publication of C. Misak’s autobiography of F P Ramsey in 2020, as well as a number of book reviews made by different reviewers of that book, have resulted in the resurrection of highly misleading claims made by F. Ramsey, when he was 18 years old, that can only be characterized as being silly -to someone who has actually read the entire book. Therefore, individuals, who have only read Part I of Keynes’s book, are highly susceptible to claims made when reading book reviews of academics who never read the book they claimed to be reviewing. Such is the case with Frank Ramsey.<br><br>The Keynes -Townshend correspondence in 1937 – 1938 over the connections between the A Treatise on Probability and the General Theory, as well as the Keynes-Tinbergen exchanges of 1938-1940 concerning Keynes’s critique or Tinbergen’s use of precise probability and the Normal distribution to model the business cycle, make it crystal clear that Keynes never accepted Ramsey’s critique in his ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3674674
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1946951.htmlThu, 01 Oct 2020 12:41:15 GMTNew: The Fundamental Error of Rational Expectations Proponents Is Their Claim that They Have Discovered True Statistical Models: Given that No Model Can Be True, Talk of Having a 'True Model' Is An Anti-Scientific Oxymoron Given Keynesian UncertaintyNo model can ever be true. By definition, models are only, at best, approximations to reality. Some models are better approximations than others, so one can talk about one model being better than another model. However, to talk about a model yielding true predictions means that the speaker does not understand what a model is and what it is used for. This is especially true in the area of probability and statistics. George Box said it well when he stated that ‘all models are wrong, but some are useful.’<br><br>Rational expectations advocates violate basic scientific approaches to theory construction and model use when they claim that there is a true model of how the economy operates that consumers and producers can learn from experience. There can never be any scientific support for that claim or any of the following claims, given that all models are only approximations, which can never be true:<br><br>• There is a true(correct, right ,valid) probability<br>• There is a ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3672010
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1945668.htmlMon, 28 Sep 2020 15:34:47 GMTREVISION: How Did Clive Bell, One of Keynes’s Bloomsbury Artist Friends, Become a Recognized Expert on Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, Given that He Had No Knowledge of Mathematical Logic, Statistics, Probability or Boolean Algebra?Clive Bell was an artist.There is no possible way that Clive Bell could have understood/advised Keynes about material appearing in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability or have had any understanding of the roles that intuition and perception played in Keynes’s logical theory of probability unless he had been a rated tournament chess player who understood the important role of intuition and perception, a role that could only be grasped by someone who has actually played Over-The-Board (OTB) tournament chess under time constraint (a clock). The belief that Clive Bell’s recollections/memories about his friendship with Keynes encompass a knowledge of Keynes’s logical theory of probability or Keynes’s concept of the role of intuition in decision making under time constraint are simply nonsense.<br><br>Bell has been cited in work done by C. MIsak in 2020, that is related to her biography on Frank Ramsey, whose subjective theory of probability was regarded by Keynes as a academic exercise that ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3632265
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1942201.htmlThu, 17 Sep 2020 09:16:33 GMTNew: J M Keynes and E. Borel’s Initial Skipping of Part II of the A Treatise on Probability in His 1924 Review: What Changed Borel’s Mind 15 Years Later?Emile Borel’s review of the A Treatise on Probability in 1924 is, in my opinion, quite above average. I would give it a grade of B/B+. Borel was also an intellectually honest researcher. Borel did not pretend to have read Parts II, III, IV, and V of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, as has been done repeatedly by psychologists, philosophers, historians, and economists, who have cited the A Treatise on Probability in their references when writing about Keynes’s logical theory of probability in his A Treatise on Probability. <br><br>Borel apologizes to Keynes (and Bertrand Russell,who Borel knew had assisted Keynes in writing the A Treatise on Probability) for not reading Part II of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability because he realized that, for Keynes, Part II was the most important part of the A Treatise on Probability. Borel was correct. It was the most important and intellectually powerful part of the book. It was the most important and intellectually powerful part of the book ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3660725
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1938362.htmlFri, 04 Sep 2020 10:30:52 GMTNew: The Role of Intuition and Perception in decision making under time constraint in Tournament Chess and probability: J M Keynes and Herbert SimonKeynes’s father, J N Keynes ,was a ranked and rated chess master in tournament chess who played first board in OTB (Over-The- Board) matches for Cambridge University in the late 1870’s and early 1880’s.J M Keynes undoubtedly learned how to play chess from his father. However, what he also learned was the important role that intuition and perception play in the OTB chess competition, but not in correspondence (postal) chess. <br><br>The nearly three hundred year old claim, originally made by J.Bentham , which is still the foundation for all classical ,neoclassical, new classical, and new neoclassical theories, is that decision makers are able to calculate an optimal numerical outcome and an optimal ,numerical probability, on which to base their future decisions (moves) in the game of life (chess) under no time constraint. Thus, the decision problem specified by Bentham is, by analogy, the type of situation faced in Correspondence or postal chess. This is also what F P Ramsey’s ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3653987
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1937948.htmlThu, 03 Sep 2020 14:04:45 GMTNew: The Myth of Richard Kahn and the Multiplier: Keynes, Not Kahn, Created the Multiplier Concept in 1921 in His a Treatise on Probability and Taught Kahn How to Write His June, 1931 Economic Journal PaperThe myth that R. Kahn taught J M Keynes the multiplier,so that without Kahn’s contribution,there would have been no possibility of Keynes having written the General Theory in 1936,like the myth that there is no IS-LM mathematical model in the General Theory , can be traced to deliberate canards made by Joan Robinson repeatedly in her life time.<br><br>Keynes exposed Robinson as an intellectual fraud in late 1936 in correspondence with her in the months of September through November when he discovered that she did not have the slightest idea about his liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest, which is impossible to analyze in (r,Y) space except with an IS-LM model.<br><br>The economics profession has incorporated these myths into the official history of economic thought and macroeconomic history, as can easily be seen by visiting Investopedia or Wikipedia. <br><br>These myths go hand in glove with other myths about Keynes, such as the myth that an 18 year old Frank Ramsey ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3659745
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1937346.htmlTue, 01 Sep 2020 16:58:18 GMTNew: Investopedia Needs to Heavily Revise Its ‘IS-LM Model’ PaperThe prevalent belief among economists that Hicks invented and developed the IS-LM model in 1937 ,which Keynes then accepted provisionally when shown the paper by Hicks, is a myth, much like the myth that R. Kahn invented the multiplier. Hick’s IS-LM model paper on the General Theory, published in the April,1937 issue of Econometrica, is based on pp.199-205 of Keynes’s General Theory plus Hicks’s unattributed use of materials that were based on Reddaway’s and Champernowne’s June, 1936 reviews of the General Theory in the Economic Record and Review of Economic Studies, respectively, but which Hicks deliberately did not cite. It is easy to compare Hicks’s June,1936 review paper, published in the Economic Journal in June,1936, which had no IS-LM model in it, with both the Reddaway and Champernowne papers, also available in June,1936,which have explicit IS-LM models specified in them.There is no mention of any IS-LM model in Hicks’s June 1936 paper in the Economic Journal at all. That ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3656347
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1935402.htmlWed, 26 Aug 2020 09:56:13 GMTNew: Investopedia’s ‘What Is the Keynesian Multiplier?’ Needs to Be Completely Revised to Correct Its Many Errors of Omission and CommissionInvestopedia’s “What is the Keynesian Multiplier “ is fundamentally flawed and needs to be completely rewritten in order to eliminate a number of errors of omission and commission concerning Richard Kahn and J M Keynes.<br><br>First,Richard Kahn’s article ,published in 1931 in the Economic Journal,was derived from Keynes’s earlier work in his A Treatise on Probability ,1921(Brady,2004) and his May,1929(Kent,2007) arithmetic example ,which follows directly from the mathematical model presented in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability on page 315 in footnote 1.The discussion in the General Theory on pp.122-123 of the theory of the multiplier follows directly from the A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>Second,Investopedia’s article completely ignores the series of articles written by Keynes in 1937 and 1938 in England on war finance and unemployment, first discussed by Terence Hutchison in 1977,demonstrating that Keynes’s support for deficit finance was strictly limited to the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3655672
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1934743.htmlMon, 24 Aug 2020 14:51:00 GMTNew: On Heterodox Attempts to Cover Up Joan Robinson’s Failure to Comprehend Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest and Keynes’s IS-LM Model in Their Correspondence of September through November,1936In September, 1936, Keynes started reviewing materials sent to him by Joan Robinson for publication as a book, titled” Essays in the Theory of Employment”, which was published in 1937 .Keynes discovered some significant misunderstandings on J. Robinson’s part regarding exchange rate and price adjustments of foreign securities between two countries. However, the much more severe problem, from Keynes’s point of view, was that, in the course of the exchanges, J. Robinson demonstrated her complete failure to grasp Keynes’s liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest, as presented by Keynes using his original IS-LM (LP) model discussed extensively in chapter 21 in Parts IV -VI on pages 298-306 of the General Theory. <br><br>This was due to Robinson’s having latched on to the initial, introductory, beginning discussions of liquidity preference in chapter 13 on page 168, where Keynes defined M=L(r). M=L(r) is what Joan Robinson over her entire life believed determined the rate of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3652997
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1934436.htmlSat, 22 Aug 2020 14:26:10 GMTREVISION: After 100 Years, the Time Has Come to Acknowledge That Boole and Keynes Founded a Mathematically, Technically, and Logically Advanced Approach to Imprecise ProbabilityKeynes’s and Boole’s contributions to the theory of imprecise probability are not just “notions” or “suggestions” or “intuitions”. Keynes and Boole actually worked out problems in great detail in which they derive lower and upper probability bounds based on their foundation of Boolean algebra and logic. Their work is very advanced and compares very favorably to work done up to the mid 1980’s, when T. Hailperin made major advances in the generalization of the Boole-Keynes approach. <br><br>Unfortunately,it appears that these contributions are not known,have been ignored,or are of a technical nature that is too difficult for present day researchers to master. Only Emil Borel in 1924 gave an answer, which was that it was too difficult for him to cover.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3632526
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1932776.htmlMon, 17 Aug 2020 16:50:23 GMTNew: Given R. Kahn’s Own 1936 Admission to H. Neisser That "My Own Ideas Were Largely Derived From Mr. Keynes", Shackle’s Claim in 1951 That "…In 1929 Lord Keynes … Groped for the Multiplier Analysis, but Failed to Seize It …", Along With Other Such Claims in His Article, Are DubiousThere is a very major problem with Shackle’s 1951 paper in the Economic Journal concerning the history of the multiplier. Shackle makes claims in his 1951 article, that were later repeated many times in other Shackle articles, that lead a reader to the conclusion that Kahn invented and developed the theory of the multiplier. However, these claims directly contradict Kahn’s own 1936 admission that “My own ideas were largely derived from Mr. Keynes.” If Kahn’s ideas were largely derived from Keynes, then Shackle’s claims that Kahn invented and developed the theory of the multiplier is dubious.<br><br>A myth has been created in the economics profession that Kahn made an completely independent, extremely crucial contribution to the development of the General Theory that was of such great importance that Keynes would not have been able to write the General Theory without it. This position is simply dubious, since Keynes had already developed and applied the mathematical and logical ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3648160
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1930211.htmlMon, 10 Aug 2020 15:34:18 GMTNew: The Fundamental, Macroeconomic Problem Is Not Uncertainty, Which Knight Stated Can Be Dealt With by ‘Estimates’ and Which Keynes Dealt With by ‘Interval Valued Probability’ and ‘Conventional Coefficients’: It Is the Continued Presence of Adam Smith’s Upper Income Class ‘Prodigals, Imprudent Risk Takers, and Projectors’ (Keynes’s Rentiers and the ‘…Aristotle's analysis of the misuse of money provided the fundamental analysis of the dangers caused by segments of the upper income class that Socrates characterized as sophistic and sycophantic. Socrates saw that the problem was that parts of the upper income class sought their political and economic advantage in a way that undermines the vitality of the middle class. Their wealth is used, not to produce investment goods, but is used to speculate in land and real estate. Today, such an approach is called financialization and securitization.<br><br>Basically, Aristotle gave a precise, general explanation of the problem. Trade and commerce through markets need money in order to facilitate the necessary transactions that result in the provision of final goods for sale in markets. These final goods were produced by skilled labor that was combined with capital, producer, or investment, goods like tools, equipment, machinery, etc. in a plant or factory. Money used for the production of ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3647635
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1929375.htmlThu, 06 Aug 2020 15:36:49 GMTNew: Comparing the Deliberate Omissions of R. Harrod in His 1951 Biography of J M Keynes With the Deliberate Omissions of R.Skidelsky in the Second Volume of His 1992 Biography of J M Keynes: The Source of All Heterodox Claims About ’Many Gaping Holes‘, Gaps', and ‘Deeply Serious Flaws’ in Keynes’s General Theory Can All Be Traced to Joan RobinsonIn the first volume of his biography of Keynes(1983),R. Skidelsky showed that R.Harrod,in 1951 in his biography on Keynes, had deliberately omitted relevant evidence about the life of J M Keynes,such as his gay sexual life up until 1921 and his conscientious objector status during WW I.Skidelsky(1983,pp.xv-xxviii) showed how Harrod had sought to give a misleading account of Keynes’s life by the deliberate omission of materials and selective quotations taken from Keynes’s letters of correspondence (1983,p.xxiii) that Harrod believed would bias readers against Keynes’s 1936 General Theory.<br><br>Unfortunately, R.Skidelsky has done exactly the same thing in the second volume of his three volume biography of Keynes as Harrod had done in 1951.Skidelsky has deliberately omitted relevant evidence regarding the roles played by Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn during the years Keynes was writing the General Theory and defending it against the mainstream neoclassical school of economics in the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3644774
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1928944.htmlWed, 05 Aug 2020 20:25:56 GMTREVISION: The Main Result of Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument Analysis, in Chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, Is That V=V(a/h) =V(a/h1, h2, h3, h4……hn, hn+1….) While the Main Result of Chapter 26 Is That V(a/h)=w, 0≤w≤1, Where w=K/[K+I] and 1-w=I/[K+I]. No Economist or Philosopher in the 20th or 21st Century Was Able to Obtain Keynes’s FinThe misbelief that Keynes's concept of the evidential weight of the evidence, V=V(a/h), in chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, represented a measure of the absolute amount of relevant evidence, came about due to the failure of all philosophers and economists in the 20th and 21st centuries, who had written on Keynes’s concept of ’weight’, with the exceptions of F Y Edgeworth, B Russell, and C D Broad, to take seriously Keynes’s footnote 1 on page 76 to chapter 26 of the A treatise on Probability, where Keynes stated that he would discuss how to integrate weight into a discussion of “…the application of probability to practice.”<br><br>The most severe errors were originally introduced by I J Good in 1950 and appeared in all of his work on Keynes after that. These errors were picked up by economists and made the foundation of their assessments of Keynes’s work starting in 1990 with a paper by Runde. It is quite impossible to add, subtract, divide, and multiply logical ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3612516
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1923901.htmlWed, 22 Jul 2020 08:41:35 GMTNew: Post Keynesian Economics Is Based on Joan Robinson’s Many Canards About Supposed Gaping Holes in Keynes’s Theory: The Real Problem Is Gaping Holes and Gross Ignorance in the Post Keynesian Understanding of Keynes’s a Treatise on ProbabilityThere is no Post Keynesian economist or allied philosopher who can comprehend the following, basic 100 year old fact-Keynes, building on Boole ‘s The Laws of Thought (1854), created an interval valued approach to probability, as well as a decision weight approach, the c coefficient, that re-expresses interval valued probability as non additive and non linear probability, that has nothing to do with radical uncertainty or ordinal probability as asserted continuously for 50 years.<br><br>Consider the example of R. Skidelsky. R. Skidelsky was very much like Joan Robinson in his academic skills, upon whom he has built his view of Keynes’s contributions. R. Skidelsky, like Joan Robinson, has admitted many times that he is mathematically illiterate, inept, and innumerant. This self admitted fact made Skidelsky very susceptible and receptive to the Frank P. Ramsey myth, recently resurrected by C. MIsak (2020). This myth purports that Ramsey, an 18 year old teenager who came to Cambridge ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3637692
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1923441.htmlTue, 21 Jul 2020 12:02:38 GMTNew: A Study of the Many, Many Conflicting ‘Tower of Babel’-Like Interpretations of Part I of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability Made by Heterodox Economists: None of These ‘Interpretations’ Deal With Parts II-V of Keynes’s a Treatise on ProbabilityThe failure of all heterodox economists to read Parts II-V of the A Treatise on Probability, especially Part II, since Part III depends on Part II and Part V depends on Part III, explains the many, many different and conflicting types of probabilities that are climes to exist in the A Treatise on Probability, as well as the many, many different definitions of uncertainty concocted by ignorant heterodox economists whose work directly contradicts and conflicts with Keynes’s explicit definitions of uncertainty in the A Treatise on Probability on pp.309-315 and in the General Theory on pages 148 and 240, definitions which Keynes himself reemphasized and reinforced to H. Townshend in their correspondence in 1937 and 1938. A reading of this correspondence leads directly to the rejection of all current claims made about so called different types of probabilities (non comparable, non numerical, non measurable, incommensurable, unknown, ordinal, comparative, qualitative, rank ordered, etc.) ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3636653
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1922954.htmlMon, 20 Jul 2020 13:34:41 GMTNew: Keynes’s Use of Certainty Equivalent, Short Run Expectations in the General Theory, the Evidential Weight of the Argument, V(a/H)=W, 0≤w≤1, the Townshend -Keynes Exchanges of 1937–38, and Is-Lm: Rational Expectations Was a Special Case for Keynes if W=1 for Long Run ExpectationsThe failure of all economists and philosophers in the 20th and 21st centuries to grasp the formal, technical analysis of the 'weight of the arguments' analysis in chapters 6 and 26 of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability explains why the footnotes on pages 148 and 240 of the General Theory, the importance of which Keynes emphasized to Townshend in 1938, at the exact same time that Keynes was also engaged in a severe critique of Tinbergen’s misapplication of the limiting frequency interpretation of probability to business cycles using a multivariate normal probability distribution, have never been incorporated into Keynes’s theory of effective demand, the D-Z model, which served as the foundation for Keynes’s IS-LM(LP) model on pp .298-299 in Part IV of chapter 21 of the General Theory.<br><br>Keynes’s certainty equivalence for the expectations embodied in Z=wN +P and D=pO incorporated expectations as a function of uncertainty, where uncertainty is a function of the evidential weight ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3630046
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1922188.htmlFri, 17 Jul 2020 09:43:04 GMTNew: On the Impossibility That Any Academic Will Ever Understand Keynes’s 1931 Assessment of Ramsey’s Work in Probability, When Compared to His Own, Until Part II of the A Treatise on Probabilit y(1921) Has Been Read: Ramsey’s Subjective Theory of Probability (Precise, Exact, Numerical, Linear, Additive, Degree of Belief) Is a Special Case of Keynes’s LBy the time that Keynes’s logical theory of probability appeared in 1921 in his A Treatise on Probability (1921), Keynes had already used it in his Indian Currency and Finance,1913, personally at the Treaty of Versailles negotiations as the official representative of the British Treasury Department, and in his Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919). Keynes was a millionaire by 1922. Keynes’s theory is an interval valued approach that can be applied in situations that require imprecise, inexact, non numerical, nonlinear, non additive, degree of rational belief. If the weight of the argument, w, is equal to, approaches, or is close to 1, 0≤w≤1, then Keynes’s theory reduces to the use of precise, exact, numerical, linear, additive, degrees of belief. This conclusion can only be reached if an academic has read and understood Part II of the A Treatise on Probability. The only academic in the 20th or 21st century who read Part II of the A Treatise on Probability was Theodore Hailperin, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3634436
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1922182.htmlFri, 17 Jul 2020 09:37:12 GMTNew: Keynes Spelt Out Exactly What 'Degree of Rational Belief ' Meant in His a Treatise on Probability (1921): Correcting the Severe Errors in Courgeau (2012)A very, very, very severe problem has been occurring repeatedly over the last 100 years in the social sciences and philosophy, when it comes to the question of understanding the meaning of Keynes ‘s logical theory of probability and his concept of rational degrees of belief. It is the failure of commentators on Keynes’s book to have actually read the A Treatise on Probability that is an ongoing problem.<br><br>Instead of reading the A Treatise on Probability, practically all social scientists and philosophers evaluate Keynes’s contribution based on a reading of F. P. Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 reviews ,which are combined with the introduction to the latest edition of the A Treatise on Probability, Volume 8 of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, written by Richard B. Braithwaite, who claimed that he had read the A Treatise on Probability during the break between academic terms at Cambridge University in 1921, as reported in C. MIsak’s 2020 biography of Frank ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3633589
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1921480.htmlWed, 15 Jul 2020 17:23:09 GMTREVISION: After 100 Years, the Time Has Come to Acknowledge That Boole and Keynes Founded a Mathematically, Technically, and Logically Advanced Approach to Imprecise ProbabilityKeynes’s and Boole’s contributions to the theory of imprecise probability are not just “notions” or “suggestions” or “intuitions”. Keynes and Boole actually worked out problems in great detail in which they derive lower and upper probability bounds based on their foundation of propositional logic. Their work is very advanced and compares very favorably to work done up to the mid 1980’s, when T. Hailperin made major advances in the generalization of the Boole-Keynes approach. <br><br>Unfortunately,it appears that these contributions are not known,have been ignored,or are of a technical nature that is too difficult for present day researchers to master. Only Emil Borel in 1924 gave an answer, which was that it was too difficult for him to cover.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3632526
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1921088.htmlTue, 14 Jul 2020 19:09:58 GMTNew: Keynes Rejected the Concepts of Probabilistic Truth, True Expected Values, True Expectations, True Probability Distributions and True Probabilities: ‘Probability Begins and Ends With Probability’ (Keynes, 1921)Ramsey’s many, many confusions and errors about Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability all stemmed from his failure to a) read more than just the first four chapters of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability(1921),b) his gross ignorance of Boole’s 1854 logical theory of probability that Keynes had built on in Parts II, III, IV, and V of the A Treatise on Probability, c) his complete and total ignorance of real world decision making under time constraint in financial markets(bond, money, stocks, commodity futures),government, industry and business, and d) his complete and total ignorance of the role that intuition and perception played in tournament chess competition under time constraint, a role that was taught to J M Keynes by his father, J N Keynes, a rated chess master who played first board for Cambridge University in the late 1870’s and early 1880’s.Keynes simply generalized the important role of intuition and perception in decision making in tournament chess competition under time ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3627339
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1918607.htmlWed, 08 Jul 2020 16:36:38 GMTNew: On Misak’s 2020 Story about Ramsey, Keynes,and Logical Probability: Keynes Never Took Ramsey’s Claims Seriously at Anytime in His LifetimeA myth has been in existence since 1922 about Keynes, Ramsey and the logical theory of probability that Keynes constructed in Parts I-V of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921.<br><br>This myth claims that Ramsey found major errors in logic and epistemology in Keynes’s work, which supposedly was about mysterious,unfathomable non measurable,non numerical Platonic probabilities that could only be intuited. Keynes supposedly, according to this myth, instantly realized that his theory had been decimated, annihilated and demolished by the 18 year old boy genius, Frank Ramsey. Keynes then supposedly retracted his theory in 1931 and supported the subjective theory of probability presented in 1926 by Ramsey in “Truth and Probability” thereafter.<br><br>This myth is the foundation for Robert Skidelsky’s Post Keynesian assessment of Keynes’s Theory of Probability and appears to be what S. Bradley presents as Keynes’s theory in the latest 2019 assessment of Keynes’s contributions in the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3625635
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1918057.htmlTue, 07 Jul 2020 16:29:41 GMTREVISION: How Did Clive Bell, One of Keynes’s Bloomsberry Artist Friends, Become a Recognized Expert on Keynes's a Treatise on Probability, given that He Had No Knowledge of Mathematical Logic, Statistics, Probability or Boolean Algebra?Clive Bell was an artist.There is no possible way that Clive Bell could have understood/advised Keynes about material appearing in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability or have had any understanding of the roles that intuition and perception played in Keynes’s logical theory of probability unless he had been a rated tournament chess player who understood the important role of intuition and perception, a role that could only be grasped by someone who has actually played Over-The-Board (OTB) tournament chess under time constraint (a clock). The belief that Clive Bell’s recollections/memories about his friendship with Keynes encompass a knowledge of Keynes’s logical theory of probability or Keynes’s concept of the role of intuition in decision making under time constraint are simply nonsense.<br><br>Bell has been cited in work done by C. MIsak in 2020, that is related to her biography on Frank Ramsey, whose subjective theory of probability was regarded by Keynes as a academic exercise that ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3632265
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1917597.htmlTue, 07 Jul 2020 10:22:27 GMTREVISION: George Box’s Realization, That All Models, Especially Statistical Models, Are Wrong Means That It Is Impossible for There to Be Any True Probabilities, True Models, True Theories, True Expectations or True (Accepted) Hypotheses: The Claims, Made By Rational Expectations Proponents About True Objective Probabilities, True Models, True Expectations, R. Muth’s 1961 paper in Econometrica is an example of an academic economist suffering from extreme and extraordinary ignorance about very basic scientific, statistical, methodological, epistemological, philosophical, and logical tenets. These tenets were all discussed rigorously by Haavelmo in his 1944 paper in Econometrica on methodological and epistemological issues related to the question about exactly what conclusions a statistical model using economic data could support as far as sound(never valid, right ,correct, true). Haavelmo’s entire 115 page article can be summarized briefly by George Box’s brief statement noted above .Muth’s belief ,that economists had derived true theories and true models is simple nonsense. What Muth should have argued in his 1961 article, but did not, is that rational expectations, when compared to its rivals,was a better model compared to the rival models in terms of minimizing its forecasting error.Of course, Muth would have had to have supported ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3623958
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1917198.htmlTue, 07 Jul 2020 08:03:58 GMTREVISION: George Box’s Realization, That All Models, Especially Statistical Models, Are Wrong Means That It Is Impossible for There to Be Any True Probabilities, True Models, True Theories, True Expectations or True (Accepted) Hypotheses: The Claims, Made By Rational Expectations Proponents About True Objective Probabilities, True Models, True Expectations, R. Muth’s 1961 paper in Econometrica is an example of an academic economist suffering from extreme and extraordinary ignorance about very basic scientific, statistical, methodological, epistemological, philosophical, and logical tenets. These tenets were all discussed rigorously by Koopman in his 1944 paper in Econometrica on methodological and epistemological issues related to the question about exactly what conclusions a statistical model using economic data could support as far as sound(never valid, right ,correct, true). Koopman’s entire 115 page article can be summarized briefly by George Box’s brief statement noted above .Muth’s belief ,that economists had derived true theories and true models is simple nonsense. What Muth should have argued in his 1961 article, but did not, is that rational expectations, when compared to its rivals,was a better model compared to the rival models in terms of minimizing its forecasting error.Of course, Muth would have had to have supported this ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3623958
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1916966.htmlThu, 02 Jul 2020 17:09:35 GMTREVISION: How Did Clive Bell, One of Keynes’s Bloomsberry Artist Friends, Become a Recognized Expert on Keynes's a Treatise on Probability, given that He Had No Knowledge of Mathematical Logic, Statistics, Probability or Boolean Algebra?Clive Bell was an artist.There is no possible way that Clive Bell could have understood/advised Keynes about material appearing in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability or have had any understanding of the roles that intuition and perception played in Keynes’s logical theory of probability unless he had been a rated tournament chess player who understood the important role of intuition and perception ,a role that could only be grasped by someone who has actually played Over -The -Board (OTB) tournament chess under time constraint(a clock).The belief that Clive Bell’s recollections/memories about his friendship with Keynes encompass a knowledge of Keynes’s logical theory of probability or Keynes’s concept of the role of intuition in decision making under time constraint are simply nonsense.<br><br>Bell has been cited in work done by C. MIsak in 2020 ,that is related to her biography on Frank Ramsey,whose subjective theory of probability was regarded by Keynes as a academic exercise ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3632265
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1914907.htmlMon, 29 Jun 2020 17:58:30 GMTNew: The Myth that Ramsey Destroyed and Demolished Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability is Easily Dismissed as a Fairy Tale by Anyone who has read Parts II-V of the A Treatise on Probability (1921)Ramsey’s many ,many confusions and errors about Keynes’s logical theory of Probability all stem from his failure to a) read more than just the first four chapters of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability(1921),b) his gross ignorance of Boole’s logical theory of probability that Keynes had built on in Parts II,III,IV,and V of the A Treatise on Probability,c) his complete and total ignorance of real world decision making in financial markets(bond, money, stocks, commodity futures),government,industry and business,and d) his complete and total ignorance of the role that intuition and perception played in tournament chess competition under time constraint,a role that was taught to J M Keynes by his father ,J N Keynes,who was a rated chess master who played first board for Cambridge University in the late 1870’s and early 1880’s.<br><br>Anyone who has read Parts II,III,IV and V of the A Treatise on Probability can avoid making the type of errors that have recently shown up again in ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3618777
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1914626.htmlMon, 29 Jun 2020 13:09:17 GMTREVISION: J M Keynes’s IS-LM Model in Chapter 21 in Part IV of the General Theory on Pages 298–299: Some Examples of Cognitive Dissonance Among Economists Attempting to Deal With Keynes’s Innovation in 1936 in 2018–2019No macroeconomist in the 20th or 21st century has been able to deal effectively with Keynes’s original work done on his IS-LM model that he carried out between December ,1933 and February ,1936,where the final version appeared in the General Theory or in his deployment of that model in his reply to Jacob Viner in his February,1937 Quarterly Journal of Economics article. <br><br>The major impediment to the grasping and understanding of Keynes’s IS-LM model for economists appears to be the claim, made by the astonishingly mathematically illiterate economist ,Joan Robinson, about having collaborated with Keynes on the writing of the General Theory. This belief is easily demonstrated to be false for any economist who reads pages 134-148 of Volume 14 of the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, where Keynes, in letters to J. Robinson, categorizes Joan Robinson’s understanding of his liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest as being ”nonsense”. <br><br>These important pages ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3534905
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1914419.htmlMon, 29 Jun 2020 09:16:18 GMTNew: AP On I J Good’s Inability to Grasp Keynes’s Complete Analysis of the Weight of the Argument: The Logical Part of the Analysis of Evidential Weight of the Argument in Chapter 6 and the Mathematical Part of the Analysis in Chapter 26 in the A Treatise On ProbabilityThe mis-belief that Keynes ‘s concept of the evidential weight of the evidence ,V=V(a/h),in chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, represented a measure of the absolute amount of relevant evidence ,can be traced back to some 40 book and journal contributions made by I J Good between 1950 and 1990.Good completely overlooked Keynes’s footnote 1 on page 76 of chapter 6 to chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability,where Keynes stated that he would discuss how to integrate weight into a discussion of “…the application of probability to practice.” This would require a mathematical analysis and ,obviously, would require the restriction that V(a/h)=w, 0≤w≤1,so as to combine it with 0≤α≤1,where P(a/h)=α.<br><br>The most severe errors about chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability were originally introduced by I J Good starting in 1950 .His repeated errors appeared in all of his work on Keynes after that for the next 40 years.These errors were then picked up by economists and ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3614914
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1912788.htmlTue, 23 Jun 2020 21:21:16 GMTNew: On the Explicit Connections Between Keynes’s Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability(1921) and Chapter Four of the General Theory(1936):Keynes’s Method in the General Theory is Inexact Measurement and Approximation using Imprecise Probability from the A Treatise on ProbabilityKeynes, as he had done in all of his major works either directly or indirectly, from the 1913 Indian Currency and Finance through the General Theory in 1936, always used his A Treatise on Probability method and methodology of inexact measurement and approximation when performing a technical analysis. This involves Keynes’s use of interval valued probability to deal with the problem of uncertainty.<br><br>Uncertainty involves non(sub ) additive probability that introduces the immense complications of non additivity and non linearity into an analysis of decision making. Uncertainty, U, itself is a function only of the Evidential weight of the argument,w,or U=g(w). It occurs if Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument,V(a/h) =w ,where 0≤w≤1,is less than 1.A w<1 automatically creates some degree of uncertainty. In Keynes’s system of logical probability, there is no other way of modelling uncertainty except as an a)interval estimate or a b) decision weight, like his conventional ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3614429
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1912694.htmlTue, 23 Jun 2020 15:59:59 GMTREVISION: The Main Result of Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument Analysis, in Chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, Is That V=V(a/H) =V(a/h1, h2, h3, h4……Hn, hn+1….) While the Main Result of Chapter 26 Is That V(a/H)=W, 0≤w≤1, Where W=K/[K+i] and 1-W=I/[K+I]. No Economist or Philosopher in the 20th or 21st Century Was Able to Obtain Keynes’s FinThe misbelief that Keynes's concept of the evidential weight of the evidence, V=V(a/h), in chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, represented a measure of the absolute amount of relevant evidence, came about due to the failure of all philosophers and economists in the 20th and 21st centuries, who had written on Keynes’s concept of ’weight’, with the exceptions of F Y Edgeworth, B Russell, and C D Broad, to take seriously Keynes’s footnote 1 on page 76 to chapter 26 of the A treatise on Probability, where Keynes stated that he would discuss how to integrate weight into a discussion of “…the application of probability to practice.”<br><br>The most severe errors were originally introduced by I J Good in 1950 and appeared in all of his work on Keynes after that. These errors were picked up by economists and made the foundation of their assessments of Keynes’s work starting in 1990 with a paper by Runde. It is quite impossible to add, subtract, divide, and multiply logical ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3612516
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1912483.htmlTue, 23 Jun 2020 09:16:26 GMTNew: A Comparison of J. M. Keynes’s Logical Approach to Probability and Any ‘Objective Bayesian’ Approach to Probability Needs to Incorporate All Five Parts of Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability, Not Just Part IPhilosophers, historians, economists, decision theorists, and psychologists have been repeating a very severe error of omission for nearly a hundred years that was originally made by the French mathematician Emile Borel in his 1924 review of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921. Borel decided to skip Parts II through V of the A treatise on Probability. He explicitly apologized to Keynes at the beginning of his review for his decision involved in skipping Part II, acknowledging to Keynes, correctly, that Part II was the most important part of the A Treatise on Probability.<br><br>Borel’s acknowledgment and apology are, in fact, an understatement, because without an understanding of Part II,it is impossible to understand Keynes’s theory of decision making and the role played by that theory in the General Theory(1936). This all comes out in the Keynes-Townshend exchanges of 1937 and 1938, where Keynes makes it crystal clear to Townshend that his theory of liquidity preference is built on ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3609624
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1910745.htmlThu, 18 Jun 2020 14:24:50 GMTNew: J M Keynes’s Contribution to Solving the Certainty Effect Problem: How Some Philosophers Overlooked Keynes’s Conventional Coefficient of Weight and Risk, CJ M Keynes solved the problems of the certainty, reflection, translation, and preference reversal effects long before these effects were specified in the post world war II literature by psychologists. Keynes recognized in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability (1921; p.313) that all of these effects were a result of non linear probability preferences on the part of the decision maker.<br><br>An understanding of Keynes’s contribution would have helped philosophers, such as I. Levi and B. Weatherson, to deal with this problem.
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3609066
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1910512.htmlThu, 18 Jun 2020 09:26:10 GMTNew: Keynes’s Application of Inexact Measurement and Approximation in Chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability Directly Conflicts with R .O’Donnell’s Claims in His Chapter 3 concerning Keynes’s Approach to Measurement in His 1989 Book, 'Keynes, Philosophy, Economics, and Politics'The claim that Keynes’s non numerical probabilities are ordinal probabilities was shown to be mathematically impossible by Keynes himself in Part II in chapter 15 of the A Treatise on Probability(1921) on pp.160-163 and in chapter 17 on pp.186-194,since Keynes’s non numerical probabilities are identical to Boole’s constituent probabilities. Keynes improved on Boole’s technique and was able to solve Boolean problems much quicker than it took Boole to solve the problems.Part II of the A Treatise on Probability is nearly identical to the analysis provided in his two Cambridge University Fellowships in 1907 and 1908. <br><br>R. O’Donnell(1989,p.60) attempted to analyze a part of page 160 of the A Treatise on Probability that dealt with Keynes’s inexact measurement and approximation approach using interval probability ,but failed to comprehend that the discussion directly contradicts his claims concerning ordinal probability made earlier in his chapter 3 on pp.50-59.His claim that ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3597804
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1905380.htmlFri, 05 Jun 2020 14:00:47 GMTNew: The Restricted Role of Caprice (Whim) in J M Keynes’s Interval Valued Theory of Probability in the A Treatise on Probability, General Theory, and in the Keynes-Townshend Correspondence of 1937–1938Keynes recognized that there were a few cases where his rational analysis of decision making under conditions of uncertainty and risk using: <br><br>(a) interval valued probability in Parts II and III of the A Treatise on Probability,<br><br>(b) decision weights in Part IV of the A Treatise on Probability ,or <br><br>(c) safety first, based on the use of Chebyshev’s Inequality, in Part V of the A Treatise on Probability, would result in a stalemate. <br><br>Although Keynes introduced his concept of caprice to deal with this problem in Part I in chapter III on p.30 of the A Treatise on Probability, a complete understanding requires a mastery of his mathematical analysis in Chapter XV, where Keynes presented part of his mathematical analysis of his Boolean based theory of imprecise, indeterminate interval valued probability. Once the link between page 30 of Chapter III and Pages 160-163 of Chapter XV is understood, then Keynes’s use of caprice in the General Theory and the ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3590871
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1902744.htmlFri, 29 May 2020 16:24:07 GMTREVISION: On Keynes’s Painstaking Slow Instruction of Harrod on the Technical Aspects of His IS-LM Model in July-September, 1935:Harrod Only Finally Understood Keynes’s IS-LM Model After He Had Read the Postscript to Keynes’s Letter of August 27th, 1935 to HarrodKeynes spent a tremendous amount of time and energy attempting to tutor Harrod on the mechanics of his IS-LM model between July to September, 1935. Keynes’s painstaking slow attempts finally led Keynes in desperation to write a three point postscript to his letter of August, 1935, that is written at a grammar school level of exposition. Only after reading Keynes’s three point postscript, written at a grammar school level of exposition, did Harrod finally grasp the point that Keynes was making, which is that it is impossible for there to be any equilibrium in Aggregate (Effective) Demand, Y, interest rate, r, space of Investment(I) and Savings(S) because the IS curve was a SINGLE, downward sloping line in (Y,r) space. There is ,obviously, a missing equation.<br><br>Harrod’s continual resort to ceteris paribus assumptions about a constant or fixed level of aggregate income ,Y, in order to support the existing classical (neoclassical ) theory of the rate of interest in (r;I,S ) space, ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3550652
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1901042.htmlTue, 26 May 2020 10:26:43 GMTNew: Can Shiozawa’s, Morioka’s and Taniuchi’s Microfoundations for Evolutionary Economics (2019) Serve As the Microfoundations for “… Post-Keynesian Economics “ (2019, p.vii)? The Answer Is Definitely Yes if Post –Keynesians Can Break Away From Joan Robinson’s Anti-Mathematical, Anti-Formalist ViewsAlthough Herbert Simon never read J M Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability (1921) or understood the necessary connections between the General Theory (1936) and the A Treatise on Probability, he independently discovered an alternate formulation that was equivalent to Keynes’s approach, but nowhere as technically advanced. Simon’s approach thus leads to the same kind of conclusions and results that Keynes provided in the A Treatise on Probability in 1921. <br><br> On p.xii, Shiozawa correctly states that “Bounded rationality is the basis of all evolutions of economic entities…” and “Because of bounded rationality, any existing entities are not optimal at any time.”, it will be necessary to connect Keynes’s degree of logical probability, P(a/h) =α, where α is a degree of rational belief, which is defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1, to Simon’s work. Keynes’s interval valued probability is always bounded below and above by lower and upper probabilities. This is what Keynes meant ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3557716
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1885687.htmlTue, 14 Apr 2020 15:33:14 GMTREVISION: Clower and His 'The Effective Demand Fraud': An Example of What Happens to a Competent Economist Who Takes Joan Robinson's Myth of Keynes As a Marshallian SeriouslyRobert Clower’s “The Effective Demand Fraud” is a good example of what can happen when a solid macroeconomist takes the myths of Joan Robinson about J. M. Keynes and the General Theory too seriously. The basis for many of Robinson’s many myths about Keynes was her claim that Keynes was a rabid Marshallian, who would only use partial equilibrium analysis because Keynes realized that a formal, mathematical, simultaneous, general equilibrium, macroeconomic model of the economy was impossible to use due to the pervasive existence of radical, fundamental and irreducible uncertainty.<br><br>Exactly the opposite is the case. Keynes was heavily influenced in his views about how to apply and use mathematics in economics by William Ernest Johnson and A C Pigou, as well as Marshall. Keynes was a Johnsonian, Pigouvian, and Marshallian economist. He was never, ever simply a Marshallian economist.<br><br>Clower completely overlooks Keynes’s IS-LP(LM) model in chapters 15 and 21 of the General ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3065376
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1885119.htmlMon, 13 Apr 2020 14:43:51 GMTREVISION: On Keynes’s Painstaking Slow Instruction of Harrod on the Technical Aspects of His IS-LM Model in July-September, 1935:Harrod Only Finally Understood Keynes’s IS-LM Model After He Had Read the Postscript to Keynes’s Letter of August 27th, 1935 to HarrodKeynes spend a tremendous amount of time and energy attempting to tutor Harrod on the mechanics of his IS-LM model between July to September ,1935. Keynes’s painstaking slow attempts finally led Keynes in desperation to write a three point postscript to his letter of August,1935, that is written at a grammar school level of exposition. Only after reading Keynes’s three point postscript, written at a grammar school level of exposition, did Harrod finally grasp the point that Keynes was making, which is that it is impossible for there to be any equilibrium in Aggregate(Effective) Demand,Y,interest rate,r, space of Investment(I) and Savings(S) because the IS curve was a SINGLE, downward sloping line in (Y,r) space. There is ,obviously, a missing equation.<br><br>Harrod’s continual resort to ceteris paribus assumptions about a constant or fixed level of aggregate income ,Y, in order to support the existing classical (neoclassical ) theory of the rate of interest in (r;I,S ) space, is ...
https://privwww.ssrn.com/abstract=3550652
https://privwww.ssrn.com/1881377.htmlWed, 01 Apr 2020 19:33:28 GMT